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ABSTRACT 
Understanding who the poor are and what defines their level of deprivation is 
critical in the state’s responsibility to its citizens. This thesis looks at how the Egyptian 
State targets the poor through the narrative of poverty during the last sixty years. While 
the state has historically addressed this issue within the broader context of societal 
welfare, it has not always specifically targeted the marginalized and vulnerable groups. 
The Egyptian State has transitioned from authoritarian socialism, to a rentier economy, 
and then to a free market state without upsetting the status quo of the ruling bureaucracy 
and state agents. Recently, it has tried to become a more welfare-oriented regime, 
attempting to cater to a population without really progressing or acknowledging the 
problem of poverty.  
This thesis aims to shed light on a particular relationship—the social contract 
between the impoverished and the state. I do this by examining how the problem of 
poverty in Egypt came to the government toward this particular group of people in order 
to understand some of the broader processes of poverty reduction, welfare, and social 
protection in Egypt. 
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Introduction 
 
HOW DOES THE STATE TARGET THE POOR IN THEIR POLICIES? 
THE CASE IN EGYPT 
 
A considerable amount of research has been focused on understanding 
impoverishment and the attempts to successfully counter its repercussions through socio-
economic programs. While poverty is undoubtedly a problem in Egypt, the measure of its 
dimension and magnitude is inconclusive.   
While there are many interrelated components that influence changes between 
poverty and marginalized groups in Egypt, one of the most crucial factors is the role of 
the Egyptian State in regard to its constituents. Government policies and ministerial 
interests are inextricably linked to the politics of welfare development and poverty. An 
examination of the different agencies, along with the motivations and obligations of the 
government to its citizens, can contribute in shedding light on both the historical and 
current complexities of the political economy in Egypt. 
According to the Egyptian constitution, the responsibilities of the State to its 
citizens include guaranteeing both equality of opportunity to all Egyptians (Article 8) and 
cultural, social and health services (Article 16). Furthermore, Article 7 states that social 
solidarity is the basis of Egyptian society. The constitution asserts that both work and 
education are rights guaranteed by the State (Article 13 and 18). These are a few of the 
rights and services constitutionally guaranteed to all Egyptian citizens.  
One of the most critical groups in Egyptian society is the extreme poor. This 
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group represents the very bottom strata of a population. The extreme poor are the most 
vulnerable, disadvantaged, and high-risk members of society. Because of this level of 
deprivation, many institutions directly target and serve this particular group.  
In the case of Egypt, it is important to examine the obligations and commitments 
of the government toward this particular group of people in order to understand some of 
the broader processes of poverty reduction, welfare, and social protection in Egypt. What 
is the Egyptian Government’s attitude and approach toward the domestic problem of 
poverty, and to what extent does the role of the poor affect this standpoint? The ability 
and effectiveness of the state to carry out polices that target the poor can be directly 
connected to the bureaucratic and political struggles in the Egyptian policy making 
process. This thesis aims to shed light on policies pursued by the government that directly 
or indirectly affect the poor in Egypt and address the attitudes of the state that determine 
how social protection or deprivation is defined. 
If the government addresses the problems of the poor, is this enough to change the 
poverty map of Egypt? Should they pursue more welfare-oriented policies? Do they or 
should they focus on the process of poverty or on reducing inequality? Which would be 
most beneficial to the “poorest” sectors of society? By focusing more on growth and the 
economy, does this help the overall social issues? What are the commitments of the 
government in terms of particular economic or political polices that can be detrimental to 
bottom rung of society? 
The objective of this thesis is to determine how the Government of Egypt 
identifies and addresses the needs of the poor through policy. The scope of this thesis 
examines the narrative of poverty in Egypt through the welfare structure of the state. The 
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role of development, economy, trade, non-state and informal poverty alleviation 
mechanisms, production, foreign aid, religion, and other socioeconomic aspects of Egypt 
are not analyzed in this thesis. They are understood, if at all, through historicizing the 
social contract in modern Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak. It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to fully address these elements, however it recognizes that they play important role 
in the composition and changes within the country. 
Let it be noted that when referring to different eras in Egypt, the policies and 
actions of the state under a particular president are not attributed to a single personality or 
action of one individual, but rather the collective group of behaviors of the government 
they represent. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully and comprehensively examine 
the role of different domestic institutions, international organizations, sociological 
groups, administrative bureaucracy, individuals and other factors that influence the roles 
and decision making of the Egyptian government. It is certainly noted that governments 
rarely act with absolute autonomy. However, this thesis focuses primarily on the 
government and population, not for the sake of excluding other actors, but to clearly draw 
an important connection in state policy and poverty. 
This project aims to contribute to current scholarship on both the micro and macro 
scales. On the macro scale, I intend to provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
the social, economic, and political dynamics between government and marginalized 
groups of society. 
On the macro scale, I intend to problematize many common assumptions used in 
the politics of ultra poverty, social protection and the role of the state in Egypt. I also 
intend to look explicitly at the objectives of the social protection packages and the role 
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they play, directly or indirectly in affecting the ultra poor groups of society. 
 
Literature Review 
Martin Ravallion is one of the most prominent and widely acknowledged scholars 
on the theory of poverty and welfare, its definitions, and the process of development.1 
Khalid El Amin further compliments this research by expounding on Ravallion’s 
empirical research to challenge commonly held assumptions that poverty is limited to 
individual, homogenous categories such as income, consumption, nutrition, or 
expenditure measurement.2 Ravallion and Amin expand on the limitations of 
conceptualizing poverty in these ways to suggest that poverty is more dynamic than the 
simple means of measurement. While there is no uniform methodology established for 
accurately representing poverty, these indicators are more useful when used in 
combination with another. It is their initial critique of the conceptual and methodological 
problems associated with poverty and its definition that will be used as the framework for 
this study.  This is important when differentiating between poor, near poor, and absolute 
or ultra poor. While previous scholarship has distinguished only between poor and non-
poor, multidimensional analysis helps fill in some of the existing gaps and limits in 
poverty research, allowing for a more dynamic and effective approach the underlying 
causes of poverty. 3 
Amartya Sen’s work on multidimensional poverty has paved the way for 
                                                
1  See “Poverty Comparisons” and “Poverty Measures” as well as other works by Ravallion and Pradhan. 
2  Ravallion “Understanding and Combating Poverty: A Quest for Conceptualization, Measurement 
Indicators, Causes, and Empirical Methodologies” 
3  See references to A.B. Atkinson 
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contemporary scholarship.4 He developed alternative models to indicate poverty by 
measuring the function and capability of an individual within a given society. This model 
is a more realistic alternative to income, consumption, or expenditure based poverty lines. 
The strongest element of his research is in the treatment of poverty as a relative concept, 
an entity that is subject to the relative conditions of deprivation, freedom, choice, and 
human capital. The qualitative nature of his poverty research takes a fundamental step 
forward toward broadening the scope of poverty research by incorporating the social and 
political aspects of wellbeing, not merely the material or tangible necessities of welfare. 
This is crucial in determining not only the agency the ultra poor are capable of, but their 
social, political, and economic assets.  
Poverty frameworks by Rouchdy, Assad, Korayam, and El Laithy can be used to 
understand the practical application of qualifying and quantifying subjective poverty in 
Egypt, as well as the importance of understanding issues with demographic poverty lines. 
By studying and comparing several prominent reports on socio-economic changes and 
impoverishment in Egypt, the level of variance found among available research on the 
topic, both in quality and content, is of significant consequence. In critiquing and 
utilizing the data taken from the government surveys, it is relevant to note that there are 
differences in opinion which researchers and institutions present as conclusive poverty 
data. However, by utilizing the results of the differing interpretations of poverty analysis, 
a broader picture of poverty in Egypt emerges. This will aid in determining the 
characteristics, demography, and assets of the ultra poor. The background these authors 
provide on poverty changes in Egypt help to understand who counts as ultra poor in 
                                                
4  See “Capabilities and Commodities” and “Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and 
Deprivation” 
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Egypt, how the social perimeters are defined, and why. 
At this point, poverty has been analyzed at length by many of the field’s most 
prominent scholars. Over time, a significant debate has emerged regarding the nature and 
significance of poverty in Egypt in reference to existing political and social structures. 
Within this debate there have emerged two preponderant paradigms of the direct and 
indirect role of the Government on Egyptian society. The first operates on the theory that 
the Government of Egypt does not adequately target, understand, or address crucial social 
issues within Egypt, and, furthermore often exacerbates the problem by ignoring and 
marginalizing the poorest in society.5 This theory recognizes the government of Egypt as 
a monolithic, authoritarian and centrist government in which its constituents suffer from 
dire socioeconomic problems, inequality social uncertainty, and political weaknesses.   
The second paradigm is more sociologically based and concentrates primarily on 
a new social contract instigated by the Government of Egypt as a means of alleviating 
some of the major poverty related problems through targeted social programs, social 
protection, civil society, and welfare.6 I seek to expand on the latter paradigm, looking at 
government initiated social protection programs in Egypt, who they target, how they 
deliver their mission, and the success of such initiatives. This new social contract 
between the government and the people is founded on the necessary role of the Egyptian 
government as a provider of rights and services to its citizens. I will also utilize official 
government discourses and ministry agendas that directly pertain to social protection 
programs. This can provide new insight on the government’s approaches to the social 
protection and the ultra poor in society and how these policies and initiatives impact the 
                                                
5  See research on politics of welfare by Simon Bromeley, Ray Bush, Eric Denis, and Mariz Tadros 
6  Assessment of Egypt by World Bank and Ministry of Economic Development (2007). 
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process of poverty in Egypt. 
In order to understand the underlying political narratives associated with ultra-
poverty and social protection, Philip Marfleet, Maye Kassem, Galal Amin, and Gouda 
Abdel-Khalek have published a collection of scholarly articles and books that outline 
some of the most important and controversial issues that emerge in the Egyptian political 
sphere such as the dynamic relationship between state and society, corruption, 
authoritarianism, bureaucratic interests, inter-ministerial conflict neoliberalism, and 
democracy.7 I will use these frameworks, along with work by Timothy Mitchell to 
supplement my understanding of the Government of Egypt’s role and commitment to 
society, specifically the poor segments of the population.  
To contextualize the importance of the government as the primary actor in 
facilitating the social, political, and economic well being of its population, I will draw on 
Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s work on the role of the welfare state.8 This will be further 
applied and supplemented by data on social programs and expenditure in Egypt by 
Markus Loewe from the ECES and Ahmed Galal. 9 
However, it must be noted that these academics contribute to issues in this thesis 
from different disciplines and backgrounds—presenting an issue in interdisciplinary 
academia. A fracture emerges in scholarship in an attempt this lofty goal to present a 
clear and consecutive analysis of changes in the Egyptian narrative. It is an ambition of 
this thesis to acknowledge a discrepancy in scholarship and present an independent and 
                                                
7  See Phillip Marfleet, Egypt: The Moment of Change (2009). 
8  Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. Why We Need a New Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 
and "The Three Political Economies of the Welfare State." Canadian Review of Sociology and 
Anthropology. 26.1 (1989). 
9  Galal, Ahmed. "Social Expenditure and the Poor in Egypt." ECES Working Paper No. 89. (2003) and 
Markus Loewe "Social Security in Egypt: An Analysis and Agenda for Policy Reform." Economic 
Research Forum: Working Papers 2024 (2000). 
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alternative narrative of problems facing Egyptian economy, society, and polity. This 
contributes to current scholarship by expanding on major areas of current literature 
regarding discourses on poverty, the social contract, the welfare of citizens, and the role 
of the state instead of relying primarily on frameworks based solely on political 
dialogues, economic discourses, or sociological theory. For example, Mitchell’s 
contribution to this field focus on issues regarding the political nature of the state and the 
economic changes that occur as a result, however this thesis uses his work to support 
elements within the historical narrative of Egypt. This thesis concedes that cross-
disciplinary incoherence’s are an issue, yet they are still valuable in understanding many 
of the critical changes and narratives in the Egyptian context. 
The first chapter will address the criteria used to quantify impoverishment 
through indicators, thresholds, and poverty lines. It will also address the limits within 
these arguments and contemporary alternative discourses. Second, it will expand on the 
characteristics of poverty, such as the depth, severity, and vulnerability. Third, it will 
address issues in the interpretation, perception and subjectivity of poverty. The second 
part of this chapter will look at impoverishment in Egypt, as well as current research and 
methodologies used to indicate and understand the process of poverty. 
The second chapter will look at the historical theory behind a social contract. This 
theory will then be applied to the relationship between the State and Egyptian citizens, by 
historicizing the historical social contract in modern Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak and 
looking at political and economic policies that affect the poor. Third, it will focus on the 
shifts and transitions in state polices in terms of poverty, social spending, and 
development.  
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The third chapter will focus on the policies of the government that affect the poor. 
First, this is examined within the historical framework presented in chapter two and the 
role of the poor within a regime. This role is approached through different mechanisms 
for poverty reduction within the state, such as entitlements, services, provisions, 
subsidies, incentives, and welfare. Second, this chapter will address the theoretical 
criteria for a welfare state and Egypt’s attempted transition from a rentier state to a 
welfare state. In order to establish this transition, the role of rentier economics and 
Washington Consensus style development will be examined as important factors that 
contribute to state polices and behavior in society. Third, state initiatives in social 
services (such as healthcare, education and social protection) are addressed in the context 
of the state’s role in a new social contract.    
The fourth chapter provides a qualitative analysis drawn from interviews 
conducted with Egyptian citizens, illustrating and supporting many conclusions drawn 
from this thesis. 
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Chapter 1 
 
WHO ARE THE POOR? 
 
Poverty is a critical issue for many reasons and goes beyond just recognizing the 
circumstances of those who are less fortunate. Concern for the impoverished stems from 
a common bond between human beings. It is an individual or a community’s 
responsibility as a member of a global society and the human race. Our opinions and 
beliefs towards poverty should not condone apathy or indifference, but should galvanize 
individuals, communities, and governments to take it upon themselves to aid fellow 
humans. The recognition and perceptions of poverty lie in the process of identifying with 
an issue that extends beyond religious, political, or social convictions. It is an issue of the 
human condition. It is in humanity’s interest to reduce inequality, to address the suffering 
and injustice amongst marginalized groups, and to protect the basic human needs of any 
member of society. It is the awareness of the human condition that brings poverty to the 
forefront of domestic development, humanitarian relief, and international aid. It is in the 
interest of those who recognize poverty to attempt to alleviate it, regardless of the 
context.  
Poverty, although found center stage in the international arena and the target of 
numerous social and political agendas, is seldom understood. It has been the subject of 
public attention, critical analysis, and contentious debate. A considerable amount of 
research has centered on understanding impoverishment and attempting to successfully 
counter its repercussions through social protection programs and economic development. 
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Many different debates exist on how to alleviate poverty through social, economic, and 
political policies, yet whether such programs truly address the underlying causes of 
poverty remains to be seen. 
 Poverty has been defined by the United Nations as "lack of income and productive 
resources to ensure sustainable livelihoods; hunger and malnutrition; ill health; limited 
or lack of access to education and other basic services; increased morbidity and 
mortality from illness; homelessness and inadequate housing; unsafe environments and 
social discrimination and exclusion.  It is also characterized by lack of participation in 
decision- making and in civil, social and cultural life.  It occurs in all countries: as mass 
poverty in many developing countries, pockets of poverty amid wealth in developed 
countries, loss of livelihoods as a result of economic recession, sudden poverty as a result 
of disaster or conflict, the poverty of low-wage workers, and the utter destitution of 
people who fall outside family support systems, social institutions and safety nets.” 
Absolute poverty is defined as "a condition characterized by severe deprivation of basic 
human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, 
education and information.  It depends not only on income but also on access to 
services."
10 
Poverty is often addressed within the context of social policy, development and 
growth.  However, the desire for developing countries, such as Egypt, to modernize and 
integrate into the liberal international economic and political system has come at a high 
social cost, reflecting some of the complex relationships between the politics of poverty, 
inequality, development, and the role of the state. It has become increasingly relevant to 
                                                
10  Gordon, David. "Indicators of Poverty and Hunger." Expert Group Meeting on Youth Development 
Indicators. United Nations: New York, University of Bristol. 2005. 
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examine the responsibility and attitudes of the state, particularly in terms of reform, 
distribution and development and the subsequent impact on poverty, welfare, and society. 
This first chapter aims to achieve a broader and more conceptual understanding of 
poverty, what it means, and how it is measured. It will address some of the theoretical 
and methodological problems associated with measuring, evaluating and qualifying 
poverty, the difficulties associated with indicating welfare, as well as alternative ways to 
represent impoverishment. In order to understand how the state identifies and addresses 
the needs and rights of the ultra poor, one must first look at how poverty is quantified. 
This includes examining how poverty is defined and how it is addressed in the context of 
the state. Analyzing the dynamics of poverty helps to understand some of the broader 
issues concerning the role of state in development and poverty alleviation polices. It is 
also important to note the evolution of thought in poverty definitions and analysis, from 
some of the more orthodox and traditional schools of thought to the more comprehensive, 
multidimensional treatment of poverty. These different schools of thought are important 
in understanding policy objectives and in targeting the government’s welfare and poverty 
reduction programs. 
This chapter will also address the criteria used to quantify impoverishment 
through indicators, thresholds, and poverty lines. It will also address limits within these 
arguments and contemporary alternative discourses. Second, it will expand on the 
characteristics of poverty such as the depth, severity, and vulnerability. Third, it will 
address issues in the interpretation, perception, and subjectivity of poverty. The second 
part of this chapter will look at impoverishment in Egypt as well as current research and 
methodologies used to indicate and understand the process of poverty. 
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Quantifying Poverty 
Understanding the different meanings of poverty is important for several reasons. 
First, quantifying poverty provides a practical way to consider and target a very real 
problem facing the world’s population. Second, it influences policy makers and global 
actors to acknowledge and include the well-being, social circumstances, and living 
conditions of poverty stricken populations in their agendas. Third, welfare analysis 
allows for a better understanding of the causes of poverty, methods to remedy the 
situation, and ways to prevent a further rise in the levels of poverty. With proper analysis, 
programs to remedy the situation and ways to prevent a further rise in the levels of 
poverty can be affected. Finally, understanding the different patterns, causes, and 
dynamics of poverty facilitate in finding a solution to this serious global problem.11 
In poverty research, the terms poverty, welfare, well-being, and material 
deprivation are often defined in terms of a practical, testable measure. For example, 
measures such as income or consumption are based on particular criteria, such as 
minimum living standards. This criterion measure is then compared to an identified 
threshold scale in order to define, indicate, and measure the term. Once an indicator is 
chosen and defined, a poverty threshold or poverty line can be drawn. From there, one 
can both theoretically and operationally quantify and measure “poverty” by those who 
fall below or above this line.  
One basic way to measure poverty is to ask whether an individual or household is 
capable of achieving a basic minimal standard of living.12 Those that cannot attain this 
                                                
11  See work by Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1983. 
12  Ravallion, Martin. "Poverty Comparisons: A Guide to Concepts and Methods." LSMS Working Paper 
World Bank 88 (1992): 7. 
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standard can be quantified as “poor” and their lifestyle can be defined as “one of 
poverty.” While there is considerable debate on how to measure this minimum standard, 
the question provides a simple way to conceptualize the fundamental principles of 
personal or household welfare.  
 
Indicating Poverty: Income 
Economist A. B. Atkinson’s contribution to poverty analysis and research focuses 
primarily on levels of income and its distribution.13 According to Atkinson, poverty can 
ultimately be understood in terms of income. After all, income has historically been the 
one of the most common methods to indicate poverty. Both tangible conditions, such as 
the ability to provide basic necessities such food, nutrition, education, and healthcare, 
along with intangible conditions, such as participation in a society, social mobility, 
freedom, and other basic liberties, are intimately related to a specific level of income.14 
Therefore, income indicators often provide useful measurement criteria for understanding 
poverty.  
A poverty line is then drawn according to those that qualify as having enough 
income to secure their basic necessities, both tangible and intangible, compared with 
those who do not.  Income generated poverty lines are traditionally measured and 
analyzed within these main categories or, in more comprehensive analyses, quantified 
accordingly to measure groups that cluster around the income poverty threshold. 
Income is dependent on several factors—wage and income rates differ in terms of 
society, culture, geography and economics. These factors are either misrepresented or 
                                                
13  Atkinson, A.B. "On the Measurement of Poverty." Econometrica 55.4 (1987): 759. 
14  Ibid., 761. 
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overlooked when income is used as an isolated poverty indicator. Furthermore, income 
minimums in developing countries differ from minimums in advanced countries, and 
rural income indicators differ from urban income indicators.15 Even if income related 
data could be measured clearly or easily, it is not easily obtained. Individuals are often 
reluctant to share their personal income data due to the sensitive nature of personal 
finance. Therefore, there are difficulties in obtaining complete and accurate data.  
 Strict income indicators also present difficulties in interpretation. Income measured 
per capita, that is, per individual, can differ drastically from income measured per 
household. It also does not account for obvious fluctuations in information and might not 
accurately represent the total picture. For example, some household annual incomes tend 
to fluctuate, subject to external shocks such as changes in jobs, pay rates, seasonal wages, 
etc. A family might also borrow money or use savings in order to meet their monetary 
needs and this would not be reflected in standard income measurement. Since monetary 
indicators would not be able to report such information, there would be a 
misrepresentative interpretation of actual income levels. Modern methodologies however 
have begun to utilize income in conjunction with other supplemental welfare indicators to 
add to a more comprehensive profile of poverty.  
Also, strict income indicators often do not account for mutual support 
mechanisms, such as a farm, factory, or other household productions. For example, a 
farmer has potential access to some basic commodities from farming, such as food, 
shelter, and water, but may not necessarily meet the minimum level of income to sustain 
                                                
15 Ravallion, M. and M. Pradhan, “Measuring Poverty Using Qualitative Perceptions of Welfare.” World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2011, Washington DC (1998): 4. 
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the perceived standard of welfare.16 Income does have to play a part at some point in 
mutual support mechanisms because it takes money to maintain a functional farm. But 
this still does not take into account other problematic factors, such as the value of farm 
assets or the changes in value of animals or crops. 
Atkinson’s argument for income measurement in poverty analysis is restrictive: 
income alone is insufficient. Although using a fixed income line is inaccurate, it is often 
used in poverty measurement. This is exemplified by the popular use of standard 
international poverty lines, based on income, typically designated at the corresponding 
value of $1 or 2$ a day. These poverty lines represent income thresholds to measure the 
minimum level necessary for basic human needs. They are based on the value of the US 
dollar purchasing power parity to compare the living standards or use of resources across 
different countries. Its value is based on the measure of commodities and services in a 
country, derived from their equivalent in the United States. Although this international 
standard is often used, it is severely limiting and accounts for some of the distorted and 
incomplete conclusions about poverty. For example, the value of one dollar in the United 
States means something quite different than the value of one dollar in Egypt. If the 
poverty line was raised to $1.25, the number of people qualified as living in poverty in 
Egypt would probably rise even though they may not be in actual poverty. An increase of 
a seemingly marginal amount, such as from $1.00 to $1.25, could have a powerful impact 
in a country such as Egypt. An extra 91 dollars (annually) represents a higher poverty line 
for Egypt; whereas an average American would not consider the increase as a vast 
difference in income. But in Egypt, any person who struggles to meet their basic needs, 
whether on $1 or $1.25, should realistically qualify as living in poverty. This 
                                                
16  Ravallion, 13. 
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demonstrates that poverty measures contingent on income is a highly relative method for 
analyzing welfare. These results make income measurement contentious and often 
misrepresentative in poverty analysis. Income measurement, while valuable in addition 
and compared with other poverty data measurement, is unrealistic and methodologically 
uncertain.17 
Furthermore, a minimum income is not universally agreed upon by any 
predetermined standard and is subject to cultural, social, economic, and political relativity 
as costs and prices differ. This is further illustrated in changes in level-based analysis 
when examining fluctuations in income requirements, which have the potential to adjust 
at international, regional, urban, rural, and local levels.18  
 
Indicating Poverty: 
Expenditure and Consumption Poverty Measures 
 Another commonly used welfare indicator is derived from expenditure and 
consumption patterns aggregated at a household level. This method often appears to be 
more accurate and less sensitive to fluctuations than income measurements. Also, 
research has demonstrated that people are more likely to disclose data about personal 
expenditure and consumption rather than private cash income wage and earnings.19 
However, when compared to income measurement, the minimum consumption level is 
subject to individual preferences of what constitutes basic food and non-food 
                                                
17  Anand, Suhir, and Christopher J. Harris. "Choosing a Welfare Indicator." American Economic Review 
4.2 (1994): 226. 
18  El Amin, Khalid Ali. "Understanding and Combating Poverty: A Quest for Conceptualization, 
Measurement Indicators, Causes and Empirical Methodologies." ERF Working Paper Series 0338. (2003): 
2. 
19  Ravallion, 7. 
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consumption. “While it is clear that every individual values food consumption, one need 
not believe that individuals are themselves good judges of the importance of nutrition to 
well-being.”20 Similar to income indicators, consumption based data is still a monetary 
measurement of poverty. There is also an issue with the accuracy of the data collected 
because people tend to understate their expenditure on commodities, particularly if the 
commodity is a luxury or illegal.21  
Another method to measure poverty can be a food basket, a device consisting of 
the necessary nutrition values purchased at local and individual prices. Food baskets are 
determined by the minimum caloric intake of for certain brackets of individuals, using 
determinates such as age, location, occupation, and gender.22 These baskets establish the 
minimum number of calories for individuals, in addition to the cost for obtaining the food 
bundle. Different levels of consumption based on demography as well as regional 
specific food baskets are taken into consideration to establish the most appropriate food 
basket for the individual. Proportionate to food bundles are the nonfood bundles, which 
are based on nonfood consumption levels of poor households. According to the EIHS, 
poor households spend up to 42% of their income on nonfood requirements.23 “The 
reference food bundle includes 184 foods, allowing more than 410 grams of food-grains 
per person per day…”24 
Food bundles are useful for determining specific consumption based poverty 
lines. Their strength lies in the idea that consumption, especially of the basic necessity of 
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food itself, is the greatest indicator of poverty. This measurement of minimum caloric 
intake as well as the access and availability of food to the poor treats poverty as a 
function of nutrition, where poverty is directly contingent to hunger and vice versa. Yet 
using food baskets as poverty indicators are weak because they limit poverty to a tangible 
consumption value.  Other elements such as human capital and development assets such 
as health, education, or the rights and entitlements of the poor are not represented.  
 
Other Indicators of Poverty 
Other indicators of welfare can be based on nutrition or food poverty lines. In this 
case, food is seen as the ultimate necessity for living because it is the most fundamental 
need for basic human survival. Research and statistics show that in low-income 
households, food accounts for the majority of total consumption expenditure.25 A 
combination of food expenditure and consumption, along with nutrition status such as 
calorie consumption for an individual or total household, can provide a more accurate 
method of welfare measurement.26 
 The food poverty line is a food bundle chosen with a particular predetermined 
calorie requirement with a composition that is consistent with the choices of low-income 
households.  It is defined for individuals in different age brackets, gender, and activity 
levels and then combined using the varying prices for food in each region. Households 
whose expenditure is below FPL are referred to as extreme poor. 
There is also difficulty with this kind of measurement. The definitions and 
methodologies used for measurement create substantial differences in the result, making 
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the conclusions relative to individual taste.  How exactly is the composition of a basic 
diet, which is needed for either survival or achievement of a basic standard of living, 
determined? It would be exceedingly subjective to have to account for every level of 
preference. These measurements would differ not only from individual to household, but 
also differ in terms of personal preferences, geography, and the relative prices of local 
food. 27 Problems also arise when considering consumption differences based on age, 
gender, or occupation. The consumption rate of a small child will be quite different than 
an adult; the consumption rate of a female would be different than that of a male; and the 
consumption rate of someone who works in a low physical activity job will be different 
from a farmhand. So there are different food requirements that can fulfill daily nutritional 
minimums.  
Also, food and nutritional levels are affected by income. A family with a steady 
income would conceivably have a regular rate of consumption. However, a household 
without a steady income could possibly have the same consumption rate because they are 
either tapping into household savings or investments or using credit. Similar to income-
based poverty lines, this measurement of economic well-being can be 
misrepresentative.28 
 
Thresholds and Poverty Lines 
One method of understanding poverty lines is in terms of absolute and relative 
measurement. An absolute poverty line has a threshold that is measured by an external, 
predetermined standard of living, for example, the real cost of basic food and nonfood 
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requirements per person. People would categorically fall into absolute poverty when they 
live below this threshold, that is when either an individual or a household cannot provide 
the basic requirements for a good quality of life.  
Relative poverty lines look at the average household within different groups in 
society.29 The measurement of relative poverty takes into account threshold variance 
based on other factors that would influence the outcome, such as geographical disparity, 
different conceptions of minimum standards, inequality, and demographic differentiation. 
However, relative poverty lines can seem misleading. They are comparatively quantified 
within a specific group.30 Take for example a wealthy country with an average household 
income of $100,000 annually. In this case, even those who fall below the relative 
threshold would still presumably have the capacity to provide for their most basic needs. 
The relative measure uses the lowest quadrants of a given society as the threshold for 
poverty. Thus, in the wealthy country case, those in the bottom strata would qualify as 
relatively poor even if they have the ability to provide for their basic needs.  
A different poverty threshold can be determined by subjective poverty lines, 
which depend on the personal judgment of an individual or household’s standard of 
living.31 The benefit of this threshold is that it identifies poverty measurement as an 
intrinsically deduced judgment by a person of what is acceptable as minimum living 
standard.32 It is more dependent on personal perception and considerations by the 
population which is being measured. But this measurement can also be problematic as it 
is inherently subject to individual preferences of basic needs. These preferences are 
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dynamic and differ based on relative criteria, such as individual taste, location, gender, 
occupation, price variation, etc. 
An example of subjective poverty analysis is demonstrated in Pradhan and 
Ravallion’s methodology for qualitative perceptions of welfare.33 While traditional 
poverty lines come with a predetermined set of nutritional or income related requirements 
for basic economic welfare measurement, this model uses a subjective poverty line.  It is 
derived from qualitative assessments of perceived consumption and taken from 
household surveys. This connection is then constructed accordingly to demonstrate a 
certain amount of income/consumption/nutrition needed to achieve the pre-determined 
requirements. What determines “the poor” is evaluated by households whose welfare 
indicators fall below the constructed line. Subjective poverty lines, for example, would 
measure poverty based on specific poverty trends. It would be beneficial to break down 
this line further into categories, such as rural/urban demographics, family size, and 
location, among other determinants of poverty. While this would be more accurate, 
Ravallion looks at current consumption patterns rather than a minimum income, which 
makes poverty profiling slightly more subjective and specific. 
But the problem with this method is that it again is subject to personal 
interpretation of minimum welfare and basic needs. Ravallion and Pradhan note the 
importance of such social specificity related to poverty lines, especially in regard to basic 
needs and nutritional requirements.34 Yet to what extent does social specificity need to be 
broken down in order to create and analyze some sort of formal measurement standard? 
There must be some definitive point in which the difference between the essential and the 
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nonessential can no longer be subject to interpretation. After all, at the extreme end, a 
starving child is a starving child regardless of culture, location, gender, or environment. 
Subjectivity must take into account the natural shifts which occur over time as a 
result of as economic, political and social changes. This presents problems in accuracy 
and quantitative poverty measurements. Furthermore, other factors that influence poverty 
and welfare measurements are demographically related such as family size and 
composition. 
 One can easily see how observation and analysis within conventional poverty line 
based frameworks are weak at best. Some poverty lines fail to take into account the 
dynamic factors of welfare analysis such as the individuality and subjectivity of 
measurement, demographic and economic variations, and inaccuracy in acquiring quality 
and uniform data.  These issues not only fluctuate in terms of measurement, but can also 
have a great impact on the outcome. The subsequent analysis and assessment 
recommendations by faulty conclusions are used as incontrovertible evidence. It has 
become increasingly important to not only realize these issues in poverty assessment, but 
to utilize this information in a collaborative effort to understand the multidimensional 
causes and effects of poverty.  
 
Other Approaches: Capability, Entitlement, and Function 
Welfare economist Amartya Sen laid the groundwork for multidimensional 
poverty research that sought to remedy the limits associated with conventional 
assessments mentioned earlier. Poverty measurement traditionally included counting the 
number of poor, using that number in relation to total population and generating a 
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poverty percentage.35 This method attempts to target and measure poverty as a fixed 
entity—defined only in terms of income for example—rather than a complex and 
dynamic phenomenon.  
Sen’s method for determining poverty composition has two requirements. First, 
there has to be a method of identifying a particular group or individual as “poor.” Only 
then can a method of aggregating the structure and makeup of this group be used in order 
to provide an overall understanding of poverty.36  
Although this may sound simple enough, it is not. Similar issues arise when trying 
to indicate “poorness.” How do you measure exactly what is poor? Should the 
identification be used strictly in terms of consumption norms? Should a poverty line be 
used to discern between groups? Do you consider changes in income? What happens if 
everyone in the measurement is above a poverty line, but you are just measuring the 
lower quadrant? Are they in true poverty or not? All of these poverty measures are 
problematic. As explained before, poverty can be interpreted in different ways. The 
problem lies in using only consumption, income, or expenditure as a uniform gauge for 
measuring poverty and understanding its causes.37 Sen sought to expand on poverty 
analysis by including new indicators. His capability framework concentrates on the 
options and limitations of preferences available to a person, rather than their behavior or 
choices. Because there are a variety of material and immaterial capabilities that can be 
used in this type of analysis, the case for this multivariate approach becomes stronger and 
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more representative than previous poverty indicators.38   
Instead of relying on fixed indicators, Sen suggests that on should approach 
poverty as a dynamic process. While looking at the relationship between ownership and 
entitlement in order to understand poverty within the framework of an individual’s 
economic value, he follows the nature of an economic system in which the “means of 
production and labor” are the dominate factors in understanding general poverty. An 
individual has a certain level of entitlement and exchange which can be influenced by 
outside factors such as cost of resources, economic situations, the availability of 
employment, wage rates, etc. Poverty results in an individual’s inability to provide, 
access, and establish entitlement.39  
Government sponsored social security systems play a further role in production 
systems and exchange entitlements. Social security, when it exists, is responsible for the 
distribution of food between different sections of the community.40 This entitlement and 
exchange level determines whether that individual can provide for his basic needs. This is 
crucial in analyzing the scale and nature of poverty.   
 Expanding on the multidimensional aspects of poverty, Sen helps to further 
broaden the definition of poverty by acknowledging the social characteristics of well-
being through a function and capability framework. Function is defined as the necessary 
action a person is able to “be,” such as to be healthy, to be free, to be employed, or to be 
educated.41 These indicators add a necessary dimension to previous static poverty 
measurement. An individual’s capability determines the alternate function. If a person 
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has the capability to achieve freedom, education, health, nutrition, or security, his 
function relies on his personal choice and freedom in determining these standards. 42  
  Capability is measured by the level a person is able to achieve these functions. 
By assessing a person’s advantages and freedoms in a given society, one can understand 
and measure his capability deprivation.  Poverty increases when a population cannot 
achieve their personal capabilities because they have less freedom in determining their 
own destiny. Other social indicators of capability can include but are not limited to life 
expectancy, access to institutions of the state, access to land, literacy, infant mortality, 
poverty headcount, school enrollment, and GDP per capita.43  
 Capability and function indicators were developed to address the theoretical and 
methodological problems associated with the multidimensional character of poverty. 
Anand and Nussbaum expand on Sen’s framework, but also include specific 
characteristics such as normal life span, affiliation, imagination and thought, control over 
one’s environment, bodily health and integrity, play, practical reason, and emotion.44 
However, Anand is correct to note that even these specific capabilities are relative and 
will differ greatly according to age, occupation, and environment. Furthermore, the 
capabilities that “people actually wish to develop seem to vary across the population with 
respect to another factors.”45 
A practical example of the capability/function approach to poverty is in the 
United Nation’s Human Development Index. It gathers information regarding education, 
health, literacy, life expectancy, and standards of living within particular countries. 
                                                
42 Sen, Amartya. Commodities and Capabilities, 18. 
43  Assad and Rouchdy, 16. 
44  Anad, 300. 
45  Ibid., 302. 
 32 
 
Instead of focusing on fixed, tangible measures, such as income or expenditure, the HDI 
focuses on a more people oriented approach, taking their freedoms and individual access 
to services as a part of poverty measurement.46 
 
Characteristics of Poverty: Depth, Severity, and Vulnerability 
David Gordon, in conjunction with research by the United Nations, presents a 
scale for understanding the depth and severity of poverty. The deprivation scale 
sequences from no deprivation to mild, moderate, severe, and extreme levels. The scale 
does not attempt to undermine the significance of general deprivation, but allows for the 
severity of circumstance for those in the lowest quintile to be recognized.47 
This scale seeks to determine some general characteristics of the ultra poor; not 
only as a function of income, expenditure, or consumption, but in a much more 
comprehensive and dynamic method. Absolute poverty thresholds include commodities 
such as food, clean water, sanitation, shelter, education, and health as well as including 
access to information and access to services.48 These represent some thresholds for what 
is determined to be basic human needs. An absolute poverty threshold exists if a person 
or household does not meet two or more standards of the criteria. This methodology 
merges the traditional definitions of poverty with multidimensional analysis.  
Furthermore, one can expand on the differences between deprivation and severe 
deprivation. For example, according to Gordon’s deprivation scale, if an individual has a 
body mass index under 16, they are severely underweight and therefore represent the 
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element of severe deprivation. The scale moves up to a body mass index of 18.5, 
anything below this threshold would represent deprivation. Using the BMI to calculate 
health and nourishment is useful. While it does not take into account individual 
preference, nutrition, or food baskets, it does provide a general idea of a person’s health 
by using their height and weight and oftentimes, age and gender. Clearly, there are 
variations for standard or optimal BMI and this measure has many limitations. However, 
because the cut off for severe deprivation is staggered to a very low BMI number, it can 
be very practical when used with other deprivation indicators.  
His scale also elaborates on specific criteria to determine the standards of his 
scale. Each one differentiates between deprivation and severe deprivation. Although his 
criteria are useful for understanding general thresholds for deprivation and severe 
deprivation, they ignore a crucial factor, the perception of poverty.  
In perceiving poverty on any scale, the role of inequality cannot be ignored. 
Inequality can intensify poverty, not only in terms of statistical facts, but in opinions of 
circumstance as well. If an individual is living in deprivation, that deprivation can seem 
exaggerated if his neighbor is living in luxury. Therefore, the perception of poverty 
cannot be ignored when looking at levels of deprivation. 
Within any given community, certain individuals may not perceive themselves as 
poor at all, even though they might not have access to health or educational facilities or 
they live in mud floor houses without modern sanitation. By most standards, this would 
constitute an extreme level of poverty. But if most of the community lived within these 
same sets of living or social circumstances, their own interpretation of poverty would be 
limited to their direct experience. For example, if everyone in an indigenous tribe in 
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South America lived in mud huts and used the local river for sustenance, inequality does 
not seem readily apparent. There is not a large discrepancy between the different groups 
in the tribe (although power and politics within any society are bound to play a role). 
However if a particular few of that group have access to other facilities or modern 
technology, or are even aware that it exists regardless of their lifestyle, they may perceive 
their situation as more unequal and more dire than otherwise 
For example, indigenous populations in South America may not view themselves 
as living in severe poverty although they could potentially fall under that category 
according to Gordon’s eight criteria. Some of these groups use rivers and ponds instead 
of modern plumbing. They have no access to healthcare; they live in houses with mud 
floors or no floors at all; they share space with four or more people per room; they have 
no access to newspapers, radios, computers, or other modern information sources. While 
many of these things may be true for large groups of marginalized peoples in societies, 
they do not automatically infer severe poverty. These criteria are largely based on a 
modern Western version of deprivation and minimum living standards, enhanced by 
inequalities in a society. You cannot be a “have not” if you are not exposed to certain 
assets that would allow you to “have” something in the first place.  
 
Vulnerability 
There are certain freedoms, choices, and rights that limit a person in poverty.  
Deprivation reflects vulnerability; the poor are often at risk in terms of health, education, 
social stability, or ill treatment and abuse by society or the state. The vulnerability 
dimension is usually due to events in which an individual has no control. For example, 
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violence, disease, economic shocks and natural disasters all reinforce a person’s attitude 
towards his own perception of poverty. Vulnerability, in this aspect, “exacerbates 
material poverty and weakens their bargaining position” of groups at risk.49 The poor 
often have no voice, control, or representation in their personal development. 
Vulnerability represents the risk a household has of falling into poverty. These groups 
often fall into poverty clusters and are highly sensitive to shocks such as emergency 
medical expenses, lost jobs, natural disasters, bad business profits, etc. Vulnerability can 
be mitigated through giving at-risk groups of society empowerment and their 
opportunities and security. Vulnerability is crucial in the experience and processes of 
poverty.  
 
Interpretation and Perception of Poverty 
Interpretations of poverty and poorness are subjective. What constitutes poverty 
to one individual may be perceived differently to another. Different poverty thresholds 
can be determined by subjective poverty lines, which depend on the personal judgment of 
an individual or household’s standard of living.50 The benefit of this threshold is that it 
identifies poverty measurement as an intrinsically deduced judgment by a person of what 
is acceptable as minimum living standard.51 Subjective poverty is more dependent on 
personal perception and considerations by the population that is being measured. For 
example, if the inequality rate is high in a country, the bottom quadrant of the population 
may not be living in actual poverty. This group may perceive their poverty based on 
                                                
49  World Development Report, Attacking Poverty: Opportunity, Empowerment, and Security. The World 
Bank: Washington DC, (2001): 3. 
50  Assad and Rouchdy, 5. 
51  Ravallion, 33. 
 36 
 
comparisons to those with better living standards. Subjective poverty is an important 
measure, but it can be problematic as it is inherently subject to individual preferences of 
basic needs. These preferences are dynamic and differ based on relative criteria, such as 
individual taste, location, gender, occupation, and price variations. 
The perception of poverty plays an important role in understanding 
impoverishment. A person’s individual perception of his own poverty greatly influences 
his level of deprivation. A government’s perception of poverty would obviously play an 
enormous role in determining social and welfare policy.   
Subjective factors such as interpretation, poverty measurement, or methods for 
quantifying growth demonstrate how poverty measures are conditional on the perception 
of one’s understanding of poverty. This can be demonstrated by the nature and scale of 
poverty studies in Egypt. Poverty analysis in Egypt differs widely in magnitude, 
distribution, and incidence, illustrated by the various conflicting representations of 
poverty in Egypt among current scholarship and research. Even more interesting is that 
the majority of work on poverty in Egypt stems from the exact same survey data 
produced by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics and the Egyptian 
government. Yet, although the data from CAPMAS is the only officially available data 
on poverty figures in Egypt, different institutions, economists, and social researchers 
have put a subjective spin on the overall results, painting a confusing and rather 
incoherent picture of poverty in Egypt. This conflict arises from the different 
methodologies and poverty lines used to indicate social welfare. Frequently, it is merely a 
minor change in percentages of poverty measurement indexes.  However, in the broader 
situation, millions of people might be ignored or incorrectly aggregated into an author’s 
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subjective category of poverty.  
 
Poverty in the Egyptian Context: 
Poverty Research and Methodologies in Egypt 
 When considering the effects of political policy, economic reform, and social 
funding directed toward welfare and well being in developing countries, policy formation 
should focus on the importance of objective poverty research and accountability. 
Poverty analysis and scholarship in Egypt are gathered from many different 
authorities; from institutions such as the World Bank or IFPRI, private researchers, 
Egyptian economists or other political economy scientists researching poverty statistics. 
Most of these reports use primary data from Household Income Expenditure and 
Consumption Surveys (HIECS) conducted by CAPMAS, the official statistical agency in 
Egypt.52 These surveys began in 1957 by the Egyptian government but were conducted 
on an irregular basis in 1964/65, 1974/75, and 1981/982.  It was not until 1990 that 
CAPMAS began issuing the surveys every 5 years.53  
While these surveys are useful in understanding broad trends in poverty in Egypt, 
they have significant limitations. First, nutritional and food related data is not readily 
available.  Second, the results and methods of calculating individual diets, which vary 
between differing ages, sexes, occupation, and geography, are ambiguous, leading many 
poverty researchers to use their own interpretive methodologies to calculate the 
magnitude and dimensions of poverty. Third, the Institute of National Planning and 
CAPMAS did not release their surveys in an individual household form nor did they 
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specify these differences and relative measurements. Furthermore, it is also unclear how 
CAPMAS accounted for regional variations with food and non-food pricing, which 
would clearly impact the construction of expenditure-based poverty lines. Finally, all of 
the poverty lines utilized are based on consumer expenditure data, which does not 
account for saving or borrowing from other sources.54  
As previously mentioned, the most consistent source of poverty analysis and 
measurement comes from the Household, Income, Expenditure, and Consumption 
Surveys for the years 1990/91, 1995/96, 1999/00, and 2004/05. These surveys were 
administrated through CAPMAS using household specific poverty lines, including both a 
standardized food and a nonfood poverty line. Economists Hanaa Kheir el Din and Heba 
el-Laithy analyzed these surveys in conjunction with poverty-related data from the 
Ministry of Economic Development, CAPMAS, and the World Bank databases.55 The 
data is useful in observing patterns of growth and poverty in Egypt during this period. 
1990 marks the initial period of consistent CAMPAS studies which were then 
surveyed and issued every five years. According to the Poverty Assessment Update, these 
surveys consist of large samples drawn from the whole country and contain data on 
income/consumption and expenditures on over 600 items of goods and services. 56  They 
provide “a good source of information on the distribution of welfare within Egyptian 
society.”57 Second, the continuity of data is important both for accuracy and consistency, 
although during this period, there was limited methodical or empirical data available 
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from official sources. No nationally representative unit level data was available for public 
usage from either government or private sources. Most of the scholars who analyze and 
report poverty statistics on Egypt note this lack of formal or reliable data for poverty and 
inequality.58  
According to El Laithy and Kheir El Din’s results, poverty—including measures 
such as depth, severity, incidence, etc.—declined during the second half of the nineties. 
This was an indirect result of the drastic GDP growth in 1994/95 compared to earlier 
years, particularly with regard to extremely high incidences of poverty in Egypt 
throughout the 1980’s.59 According to the author’s estimates and information from the 
HIECS, the results were interpreted using poverty indicators that represented a person’s 
ability to obtain basic food and nonfood needs. This was based on individual per capita 
poverty lines and then measured and calculated using household poverty lines. The 
incidence, depth, and severity of poverty were calculated by using aggregate poverty 
measures from 1990 to 2005. According to this data, poverty fell from 24.18% of the 
population in 1990/91 to 19.41% in 1995/96. It decreased further from 19.41% to 16.74% 
in 1999/00. The poverty rate then increased from 16.74 to 19.56 percent in 2004/05.60 
The data also showed that both the depth and severity of poverty followed similar 
patterns. Both measures decreased dramatically from 1990/91 to 1995/96, dropped 
further in 1999/00, and then increased in 2004/05.  
In terms of household income inequality the gini coefficient (the measure of 
inequality of wealth) decreased from 1990/91 to 1995/96 which indicated a better 
distribution of wealth. From 1995/96 to 1999/00, the gini coefficient increased slightly 
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which demonstrated an increase of wealth inequality. However, from 1999/00 to 2004/05, 
inequality decreased to its lowest relative level in the 15-year period. Inequality was 
lowest in 2004/05, suggesting a more equitable distribution of wealth and a smaller 
poverty gap. If this information is marginally correct, one could arguably conclude that 
income distribution has improved from 1990-2005.61 This data, compared with the survey 
data, provides a general and approximate conceptualization of poverty in Egypt. 
 
Poverty in Egypt 
 When discussing ultra poverty, extreme impoverishment, and absolute poor groups 
in a society, one is talking about the highly marginalized, vulnerable, and high-risk social 
groups. In Datt, Joliffe, and Sharma’s profile of poverty in Egypt, they note some of the 
common characteristics of those living in severe impoverishment. They use per capita 
consumption as a measure of individual welfare to reflect individual preferences 
conditional on prices and incomes. They also incorporate regional differences, size and 
age composition of households and nonfood consumption preferences for relatively poor 
households to portray a comprehensive profile of the levels of poverty in Egypt. 
Accordingly, in 1997, about 15.7 million or 26.5 percent of the population in Egypt was 
classified as poor. Within this group of poor, 5.1 million were determined to be living in 
absolute poverty or ultra poor.62 While the poverty gap index and headcount index did 
not show the severity of poverty, the poverty-gap and squared-poverty-gap indexes are 
the worst in the rural regions. However the Gini coefficient is worse in the urban areas.63  
 Datt and Joliffe’s research in Egypt correlate with some demographic 
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generalizations in poverty indicators and comparisons. For example, some of the poorest 
households have larger households and higher dependency ratios.64 These households 
have members who are between the ages of 0-15 or over 60 and would not traditionally 
contribute to the sustainability and management of a household. Instead they depend on 
other members of the family for financial, economic, and social support. Extreme poor 
household compositions typically are larger than poor households with an average 8 
family members while poor households are around 5.4 members.65 Female-headed 
households are also vulnerable and are at risk to live in absolute impoverishment. The 
ultra poor have a much higher percentage of family members who do not complete 
primary school.66 Most work as casual wage laborers; employment that is rarely 
consistent and highly vulnerable to shocks. Absolute poverty is prevalent in rural areas, 
specifically Upper Egypt. About seventy-four percent of the ultra poor population lives in 
rural areas. 
 
Levels of Poverty, Impoverishment, and Deprivation 
 A comprehensive report on Egypt was issued as the Poverty Assessment Update in 
2007, which looks at the same survey time periods as El Laithy and Kheir El Din’s 
research. The Ministry of Economic Development and the World Bank developed this 
study, emphasizing the necessity for some kind of agreement on poverty measurement in 
Egypt. The assessment conceded that, while no single method to accurately indicate or 
measure poverty exists, it was important not to confine poverty within the framework of 
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only measuring limited income.67 In order to comprehensively measure the state of 
deprivation, one should use the multiple dimensions of indicators and data into account.  
The Poverty Assessment Update attempts to obtain a general consensus on poverty 
measurement with statistical and analytical support from Ravallion, El Laithy, Lokshin, 
and Banerji’s research, as well as prior research on the subject from the World Bank 
archives.68 It claims self-accuracy by using local prices and poverty lines adjusted to 
household demographics throughout the report. 
This poverty assessment uses three primary aggregate measures to account for the 
‘multidimensionality’ of poverty.69 First, the head count index measures the prevalence 
of poverty determined by a poverty line. It shows the percentage of poor as a proportion 
of the total population. However, this indicator does not reflect the dynamics of 
distribution of the poor that exist below the poverty line, but simply paints a static picture 
of poor vs. non-poor. Second, the poverty gap index calculates the depth and magnitude 
of poverty—the gap between low-income expenditure levels and the poverty line. Lastly, 
the poverty severity index measures the degree of inequality in the distribution below the 
poverty line, giving a greater weight to households at the bottom of expenditure or 
income distribution.70  
Instead of setting a standard income or consumption line which is often used in 
research on this subject, the assessment classifies poverty into three groups: extreme, 
absolute, and near poverty. These three groups combined constitute the poor. Each 
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category has its own poverty line and is assessed by comparing household consumption 
by HIECS representative survey. In 2005 dollar values, one dollar purchasing power 
parity (PPP) is the equivalent to 2.57 Egyptian pounds.71 Dollars with the same 
purchasing power in the United States, when conflated with goods and services, are more 
expensive in the US, one PPP dollar per day is equivalent of much less than a current 
exchange rate would imply. Those classified as extremely poor are considered as 
individuals who spend less than 995 Egyptian pounds (in 2005 PPP value) per year. 
Absolute poor is classified as those spending less than 1,423 pounds per year. Those who 
are near poor spend between 1,424 and 1,854 pounds per year. One can expand on this 
approach by breaking the estimated poverty lines even further to account for age, gender, 
region, and household size. 
While previous poverty measurements ignored the significant differences in 
consumption patterns and prices across the region, the assessment uses a cost-of-basic-
needs methodology in order to establish subsistence minimums. For example, it is crucial 
for accuracy to account for different requirements of different household members, to 
take economies of scale within the household into account, as well as to consider that 
non-food items can be shared among household members. The methodology used in this 
report can account for the problems with previous poverty research in Egypt. 
 Accordingly, Egypt follows an absolute poverty line with a focus on those who are 
deprived of the ‘most basic needs,’ rather than those who potentially face deprivation 
relative to their fellow citizens. Using the PPP exchange rate as a set value for the 95/96, 
99/00, and 04/05 surveys, two internationally standard poverty lines are used in this 
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report.  This allows for a broader understanding of the circumstances of minimum living 
standards, defined as 1$ a day, and those who are more prone or vulnerable to poverty 
denoted by 2$ a day.72  
 In combining this poverty line with total poverty line, the food poverty line is 
supplemented by an allowance for expenditure for essential non-food goods.  The price of 
non-food expenses is estimated by identifying the share of non-food expenditure for 
households whose total expenditure was equivalent to the food poverty line.73 Poverty 
rates are based on comparisons between actual expenditure and the cost of a consumption 
basket securing 2,470 calories per day per person, along with some additional basic 
services. 
This report thus concludes that approximately forty percent of the population in 
Egypt is clustered between one and two dollars per capita a day. It also notes that in 
examining the poverty trends from 1996-2005, the poverty rate was 19.4% in 1996, 
16.7% in 2000, and 19.6% in 2005. This confirms El Laithy and Kheir El Din’s 
estimates. The assessment further reports that those who faced extreme poverty were at 
2% in 1996, 2.9% in 2000, and 3.8% in 2005. Those that were near poverty were at 32% 
in 1996, 25.9% in 2000, and 29.9 percent in 2005. The poverty gap index was 3.4% in 
1996, 3.0% in 2000, and 3.6% in 2005. The poverty severity index was at 2% in 1996, 
2.9% in 2000, and 3.8% in 2005. These conclusions represent the overall poverty profile 
of Egypt during this time period.74 
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Conclusion 
Orthodox methodologies have historically treated poverty as composed of one or 
two characteristics. If poverty can be identified within the confines of a specific entity 
with singular dynamics, then understanding and addressing poverty becomes quite 
simple.  It becomes easy to determine the cause, to fashion a model and to eliminate the 
problem. If poverty is truly based only on income, then the problem lies inherently with 
monetary measurement.  Subsequent poverty alleviation programs will target these goals 
specifically. Yet, modern interpretations of poverty conclude that income is merely one 
of many facets of poverty. This multidimensional process is more complicated and it goes 
beyond tangible measures of welfare. 
 The idea that poverty can be eradicated or eliminated is an inadequate and 
unproductive way to understand the problem. This is reflected in attitudes and approaches 
that understand poverty in fixed terms: based on income, expenditure, or consumption as 
the only determinants of poverty. By focusing on poverty approaches this way, it 
becomes a simple matter of increasing income or consumption levels as an effective 
means of poverty reduction.   
However, this one-size fits all approach has not worked in poverty reduction 
strategies, nor will it in the future.  Poverty is not defined by a combination of fixed 
principles that determine welfare. Welfare and poverty are dynamic processes and should 
be treated as multidimensional in poverty profiling in order to truly evaluate and address 
the problems. 
Understanding who the poor are and what defines their level of deprivation is also 
critical in this thesis. Understanding the limits in definitions, methodologies, processes, 
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and perceptions of poverty aid in understanding broader issues concerning the role of the 
state and its obligations on a population’s welfare. By examining the criteria of how the 
poor are identified, the different dynamics of poverty, and the methods of measuring 
welfare, one can better understand the role of the government towards this particular 
group of people which helps shed light on the broader processes of poverty reduction, 
welfare, and social protection in Egypt. 
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Chapter Two 
 
POLICIES, OBJECTIVES, AND ATTITUDES: 
HOW DOES THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT APPROACH POVERTY? 
  
 This chapter will further examine poverty through the relationship between state 
and society and the evolution of the social contract between the Egyptian Government 
and its constituents. This relationship can be illustrated by examining the values and 
incentives that affect policy, the role of the state and the people, the institutional 
environment, and the fiscal and welfare policies that operate within this framework. How 
has the Government of Egypt acknowledged and understood poverty? In order to answer 
this question, it is important to look at the different social and economic policies pursued 
by the government that influence poverty in Egypt.  
Furthermore, it is necessary to understand the historical context of the state’s 
relationship with society and how this has aided in an evolution of government 
perception of poverty, deprivation, and welfare. How does the Egyptian Government 
counter the process of poverty? Has the government always targeted the poor specifically 
or were polices in place that benefited the entire population? Does the government have a 
larger commitment to the ultra poor in their society? This chapter seeks to expand on how 
the attitudes and commitments of the state play a crucial role in determining who the poor 
are, what polices should benefit members of society, what institutions are in place for 
society and how to structure poverty alleviation programs. 
The contemporary Egyptian State has one of the primary roles in influencing the 
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direction and implementation of social and economic policies. The power relations 
between different political structures, such as the government and its ministries, along 
with the role of a powerful bureaucracy, play a significant part in the application and 
effectiveness of poverty alleviation strategies. The Egyptian State is clearly instrumental 
in determining the feasibility of poverty reduction policies for the country.  Before one 
can look at the direct role of particular polices that target the poor, it is relevant to look 
first at the objectives and attitudes of the state towards the problem of poverty. Do they 
differentiate between poor or ultra poor? Do social and economic ministries target 
poverty as something that goes beyond mere income measure? What are the priorities and 
obligations of the state in poverty reduction? Are the government and its ministries active 
and receptive to policies that effectively target and combat poverty? 
First, this chapter will look at the historical theory behind a social contract. 
Second, it will apply this theory to the relationship between the state and Egyptian 
citizens. This is done through historicizing the historical social contract in modern Egypt 
from Nasser to Mubarak and looking at political and economic policies that affect the 
poor. Third, it will focus on the shifts and transitions in state polices in terms of poverty, 
social spending, and development.  
 
Social Contract And The Capacity Of The State 
It is important within this thesis to expand on the political theory of social 
contract in order to illustrate the relationship between state and society in Egypt. In 
principle, one must look at how a society is arranged, what obligations that society has 
within itself, and what agreements and conditions are being made for and by this group. 
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In other words, what kind of agreements exists between a population, a government, or 
an institutional mechanism that allow a society to function? 
 One of the most prominent social contract theorists, Thomas Hobbes, suggested 
that violence and the uncertainty of life in the state of nature was the underlying 
motivation for people to form governments. According to Hobbes, in order to “preserve 
their lives and achieve a comfortable existence,” people create political societies.75 The 
“state of nature” is constantly in conflict and only political authority can maintain peace. 
The most natural state, Hobbes argues, is when every member of society has complete 
and total natural freedom. In this natural society, freedom neither limits the right to hurt 
others nor limits the freedom to act without consequences to achieve self-preservation. 
This results in disorder and chaos. Therefore, people enter into a social contract with a 
government to establish a civil society in which the community forfeits some rights and 
freedoms in order to achieve a functioning political society. The means—exchanging 
individual rights for civil rights in order to become a part of society—justify the end—a 
politically and socially functional order.  
Jean Jacques Rousseau expanded on this idea by adding the importance of the 
general will of the people into regulating a social contract.76 The social contract would be 
true and legitimate if it benefited the majority of the society. Members of society had the 
freedom to agree upon and chose the fundamental laws and organization for the 
community. John Locke also supported this idea of a contract that recognized and 
supported the general will and common good of people within a society. Locke argued 
that people would naturally come together in an organized society, rather than out of fear 
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like Hobbes.  
While social contracts should be created for the collective good of the people, 
Rousseau also took into account the problems with individual sovereignty.77 A person 
within a society may not always behave in a manner that benefits the collective interest of 
the group, thus, the need arises for a rule of law for which both the people and the 
governments are accountable. The social contract represents an agreement in which a 
people choose to give up certain natural freedoms in order to achieve order, stability, and 
civil society. The consent of the people is the most crucial component in the social 
contract. 
 
Historicizing The Social Contract In Modern Egypt: 
From Nasser To Mubarak 
Egypt has gone through many transitions over the past sixty years, with the 
relationship between the government and its population evolving in terms of the social 
benefits it extends to the society and in particular, the poor. It is important to understand 
the historical social contract between state and society. This helps to shed light on how 
the state understands and recognizes the processes of poverty and how they attempt to 
address it through social contracts with the population.  
One this is established, one must also look at some of the development discourses 
and schools of thought that have influenced the states polices towards social welfare. This 
aids in understanding how the Egyptian State approaches poverty reduction through 
political policies, social contracts, and economic development and how the attitudes and 
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objectives of the state have shifted over time. 
 
Nasser And The Social Contract Through State Autonomy 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, the second president of Egypt, implemented drastic national 
socialist reforms which allowed his regime a certain degree of solidarity with the 
Egyptian population. The coup in 1952 led to Nasser’s consolidation of power and the 
beginning of a socialist authoritarian regime.78 Nasser did many things to assert his 
legitimacy and control over Egypt. Under his regime, agrarian and socioeconomic 
reforms “left no doubt to the masses and the political elite that he was the ultimate source 
of power and authority” in the Egyptian state.79 The heavy reliance on state-led 
industrialization eliminated colonial and landowning elite interests as powerful influences 
in civil society. Instead, the polices of Nasser’s government led to the growth of internal 
bureaucracies, government organizations and the development of a strong military 
establishment, establishing these institutions as powerful social and political agents 
within the Egyptian state. Also, state initiated programs provided for free health care, free 
public education, social services that targeted low-income groups, a strong subsidy 
program for state resources, and labor reforms with a standard minimum wage and labor 
rights. 
 
State Polices Under Nasser 
 Nasser nationalized major companies and industries including banks, foreign 
assets, newspapers and the Suez Canal. State led agrarian reform and redistribution 
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polices led to the Land Reform Law of 1952. This law limited land ownership in an effort 
to eliminate the political and economic influence of large land owning elites.80 He also 
nationalized industries such as petroleum and mining, which fell under state control. 
These agricultural and industrial nationalization and sequestration policies did in fact 
allow the growth of state domination in politics, society, and economy. But the raising of 
minimum wages, social services, investments in agriculture and industry, manufacturing, 
and the growing power of the army and government contributed to “the rise in the rate of 
social mobility in Egypt during the Nasserist era.”81 The social circumstances under 
Nasser allowed for a greater degree of social mobility in exchange for acceptance of total 
state control. 
 
Social Polices Under Nasser: Addressing The Social Contract 
Through The Consolidation Of Power 
  Social policies and programs under the Nasser regime redefined the social 
contract between Nasser and the Egyptian population. These policies and programs 
included the guaranteed employment of state university graduates and national insurance 
programs. These programs redefined the social contract between Nasser and the Egyptian 
population.82 These policies also provided new social and economic rights to the working 
classes in return for submission to an “institutionalized formal system of personal 
political control over individuals, groupings, and state institutions.” 83 These new state 
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policies allowed some degree of social entitlement: access to state establishments, new 
employment opportunities, and development of human capital. Historically, it is often 
understood that Nasser garnered support from the rising middle class in order to 
legitimize his power, rather than the traditionally powerful elitist class.84 However, a 
more persuasive argument is that these policies were genuine efforts to develop as an 
economically and politically independent state as strong, and self-sufficient as possible.
 Towards the end of Nasser’s regime, Egypt’s growth began to decline. This was 
due to the massive social expenditures the government spent on economic policies as 
well as a general lack of foreign investment for projects within the state. Nationalization 
and socialist policies were unsustainable. However, powerful social elements within 
Nasser’s regime, such as institutions that emphasized the military and the military 
controlled civilian bureaucracy, continued to grow as powerful forces in Egyptian 
society. “It was a premise of Egypt’s growth strategy in the 1950s and throughout the 
1960s that the state must undertake far more than infrastructural investment and the 
mobilization of development capital and, through public enterprises, nationalized banks, 
and state-controlled foreign trade, must dominate and lead the entire economy.”85  
 
Sadat, Continuing The Consolidation Of Power And Addressing 
The Social Contract Through The Economy 
 In 1970, Anwar Al Sadat came to power. Sadat and his government were intent on 
addressing Egypt’s economic problems through privatization and direct foreign 
investment schemes—evident in Law 65. Implemented in 1971, this law was designed to 
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attract foreign private investment by providing exemptions from taxation and promoted 
further economic liberalization. The fruits of this policy were not really long lasting 
because the 1973 war directed the attention of the state elsewhere. 86 
 Under Sadat, the state embarked on the Infitah or Open Door Policy, by passing 
Law 43 in 1974. These policies sought to focus on the private sector as a means to rapidly 
generate revenue while still attempting to continue to provide welfare benefits. Law 43 
included “guarantees against sequestration, nationalization, or transfer to public use 
without compensation. It also stipulated that projects based on it are private enterprises 
irrespective of the legal nature of the shareholders.”87 The Infitah gave new rights and 
opportunities to private sector interests, leading to the establishment of private 
businessmen, foreign corporations, entrepreneurial elites, and other non-state actors.88  
 Yet the Infitah saw the emergence of Egypt as a rentier economy that became 
increasingly dependent on foreign investment and revenue. Multinational stakeholders 
competed with local institutions for economic control of the private sector, trade, 
export/imports, and investment. Furthermore, the established bureaucracy from Nasser’s 
era remained a powerful force during Sadat’s regime in Egyptian society and economy. 
The Infitah and new private sector development did not do much to alter this picture 
because the main proponents of this policy were only interested in tourist, real estate, and 
service industries. 
 The negative social effects of the Infitah economic policies allowed a new 
platform for religious groups and charities, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. They began 
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providing welfare services to the growing number of poor in Egypt, a role which not only 
assured them of popular support amongst low-income populations, but also provide an 
alternative as a political force to constituents who were unhappy with government 
policies.89 This resulted in a power struggle within Egypt, resulting in the extreme 
suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly as seen later under the Mubarak 
regime.90 
 
State Polices Under Sadat: Public vs. Private Sector 
 Under Nasser, the state focused on public sector growth; under Sadat, the state 
focused on private sector growth. During these periods, the labor market played a 
tremendous role in the social contract between population and state. Citizens must adapt 
to this system by choosing between decreasing their wages and securing employment or 
risking salary instability and unemployment. This represents a bargain and commitment 
between citizens and the state. In Egypt, the balance between the rights and goals of 
workers is highly contingent on public/private sector relations. Nasser promoted highly 
centralized economic growth policies such as land reform, independence from foreign 
investment, and domestic industrialization. These policies proved advantageous to the 
rising middle class and bureaucracy, which was where much of his social and political 
support came from. However, after Nasser, Sadat pushed for a more liberal economic 
policy and the Egyptian economy suffered. The rise of the private sector widened the gap 
between the rich and poor and the economy experienced growth, but inflation and high 
levels of unemployment as well.  
                                                
89  Farah, Nadia. Egypt's Political Economy: Power Relations in Development. (Cairo, 2009): 77. 
90  For more on the role of Islamic NGOs and religious based charities, please see work by Soheir Morsy, 
Iman Hamady, and Hassan Hanafi.  
 56 
 
 The rise of the private sector was the most substantial achievement of the Infitah, 
however these investments were limited to luxury goods and enterprises rather than 
production, industry, and manufacturing sectors. This targeted development excluded the 
poor, further alienating the relationship between government and people. As Egypt 
became a rentier state—a state dependent on revenue from external rents, such as foreign 
aid, natural gas, or oil—inequality rose drastically and poverty became a widespread 
problem.91 Rentier states rarely promote economic development. They essentially allow 
the government a certain degree of domestic autonomy due to their monopoly on 
economic power. 
 Furthermore, Sadat did not account for a rapidly growing population with more 
labor market entrants than ever.  Likewise, his economic policies did not promote a rise 
in employment to cope with the expanding workforce.92 Aside from employment issues, 
inflation grew to catastrophic rates, averaging around 30%. During this time, the 
economy transferred from large landholding elites to private investors and relied 
increasingly on generating rents, rather than internal development. Sadat’s economic 
policies would be the subject of much controversy later.  It was perceived to widen the 
gap between rich and poor and it allowed foreign investors to control state enterprises 
without regulation. The Open Door Policy was also viewed as Egypt’s attempt to become 
even more politically and economically integrated into international markets.93 
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Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
Population 27,798,152 31,572,753 35,574,953 39,599,405 44,433,037 50,654,901 
Source: World Databank 
94
 
 
Social Impacts Of Privatization 
 The transfer from public to private sector under the Sadat Regime had many 
social and political repercussions. “The death of Gamal Abdel Nasser in September 1971 
and Anwar al Sadat’s consolidation of power by the arrest of leading Nasserists on May 
15, 1971 created an opening to articulate economic demands that first emerged during the 
economic crisis of 1965-1966 but were postponed by the 1967 war and the 1969-1970 
war of attrition over the Suez Canal.”95 The early 70s saw a rise in collective action and 
mass strikes with workers demonstrating for higher wages. Results were repressive, and 
many strike leaders were arrested and imprisoned. The strikes were mostly contained to 
public sector enterprises, which had benefited from Nasser’s previous policies.96 One of 
the most notable demonstrations occurred in 1977 when the government, influenced by 
the IMF, cut subsidies on basic consumer goods, while raising commodity prices 25-50 
percent. Workers, students, and the unemployed all protested this policy in the Bread 
Riots of 1977. 
 
Economy And Society: Migration And Remittances Under Sadat 
 The substantial changes in Egypt under Sadat were a result of the oil boom in the 
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1970S and its subsequent impact on regional migration. Aside from liberalization and 
privatization, the Infitah sought to promote trade and investment from Western countries. 
It also sought to attract remittances and capital from the oil rich Gulf States. The 
economy had trouble supporting the policies of Nasser and the resources and employment 
availability to support the burgeoning population of Egypt presented an immediate 
problem. Two of the largest demographic pressures were a rapid population growth and 
high levels of unemployment, particularly in the youth age range. Thus, many Egyptians 
sought work out of the country, which helped create opportunities and employment for 
citizens. 
Migration meant a circulation of labor and money within the economy, with a 
promise of creating a balance between the very wealthy gulf countries and the non-oil 
countries that supplied them with labor capital.97 The remittances brought back by the 
migrants provided increasing domestic capital. In return, the labor importing countries 
also benefited from cheaper labor, a lessening of labor shortages, and a circulation of 
labor and capital within the region.  
 
Year 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Workers remittances 
and receipts 
.927 1.77 2.21 2.69 2.18 2.44 3.66 3.96 3.21 
Source:  International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files.
9899 
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In the short term, the benefits of regional migration under Sadat seemed to solve 
many problems. The rising pressures of growing populations on education, healthcare, 
and the labor market forced Egyptians to satisfy their economic needs elsewhere. The 
government infrastructure—both in the public and private sectors—could not keep up 
and maintain liberalization at the same time. Domestic markets could not absorb neither 
the growing number of labor entrants in the public sector nor continue to provide social 
returns in the work force. However, along with the massive flight of migration workers, 
there was a corresponding outflow of skills and human investment. This was and is one 
of the biggest issues with migration.  
“If we ignore the terrible eight years that followed the 1967 military defeat, in 
which nothing seemed to happen neither in terms of GDP growth nor to equity (both 
largely as a result of the military defeat), the next ten years (1975 – 85) was a period of 
very high growth rates, rapid increase in inequality but also a significant improvement in 
the state of the poor.  The greater integration with the world (and regional) economy, as a 
result of Sadat’s Open Door Policy, brought about all the three results, but it must be 
emphasized that the favorable impact on the standard of living of the poor was the result 
of a particular, and unusual form of such integration, namely massive migration of 
Egyptian labor to the oil-rich Arab countries.  This time, greater ‘globalization’ seems to 
be good for the poor, even though inequality also increased”100 While Egypt’s economy 
experienced growth through an increase in foreign investment and a rising GDP, the 
government, which accounts for major public sector employment, failed to adequately 
raise wages or the standard of living for the population.  
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Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files 
101
 
 
 
Mubarak: Reforming The Economy, Reforming Society 
 After Sadat was assassinated, Hosni Mubarak became president. His legacy is 
often defined as the era of economic reform and structural adjustment policies. These 
policies began in the late eighties, but it was only in 1991 that a rigorous program was 
implemented in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and 
the Government of Egypt.  
The early nineties saw Egypt on the verge of economic collapse, the national debt 
was over 49 billion dollars and the Gulf Crisis severely devastated the regional 
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economy.102 During Mubarak’s early reign, Egypt experienced rising unemployment, 
along with a dependence on rents which led to major fiscal imbalances. The failure of 
public industries, inflation, a surge in foreign debt, budget gaps, and a decline in trade 
forced the government to adopt an International Monetary Fund supported stabilization 
plan.103 However, when interregional migration continued to slow, many Egyptians lost 
their jobs and the state lost remittances.  However, as a reward for Egypt’s contribution in 
the Gulf War, half of the state’s foreign debt was cancelled by international financial 
instructions such as the IMF and World Bank. These institutions began to focus on 
aligning Egypt’s development with reform policies. Egyptian economic reforms under 
Mubarak were met with remarkable success that “vindicated the principles of 
neoliberalism”104 and promoted privatization, trade liberalization, and deregulation. 
Egypt undertook several reformed economic programs and eventually saw economic 
growth over 5% a year, a stable Egyptian pound, a reduction in inflation, and a lower 
budget deficit rate.  
 
Mubarak and Economic Reform 
In terms of economy, the IMF/World Bank economic reform programs sought to 
remedy the previous protectionist policies that Nasser had so vigorously promoted. The 
ERSAP called for total economic liberalization, privatization, and the reduction of state 
power in economic policies. The main purpose of the ERSAP agenda was to transform 
the Egyptian economy into a more market focused system with a higher growth trajectory 
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and financial stabilization.105 This was pursued in order to eliminate rising fiscal 
imbalances and distortions in the current economy by adjusting and reforming the public 
sector, monetary policies, social policies, investment, exchange rates, trade liberalization, 
budget reduction, balance of payments, and domestic prices.106 Economic growth would 
promote higher living standards, reverse increases in unemployment, reduce poverty, and 
most importantly, integrate Egypt into the world economy. 
The economic reform and structural adjustment programs of the early nineties 
followed the strategy that economic growth and development would thrive in a market 
competitive economy free of government restriction. Given this opportunity, the supply-
side of the economy would respond appropriately. State owned enterprises were 
detrimental to growth. Theoretically, socio-economic inequalities would subsequently be 
minimized through the trickle down effect of market revenue.107  
In terms of public sector reform, the ERSAP sought to make the public sector 
more efficient through privatization of certain institutions in the commodity and financial 
sectors. Fiscal policy reform included the liberalization of prices, such as the adjustment 
of energy prices to match international equivalents, the elimination of rent controls, and 
the liberalization of agrarian land prices. Banks were allowed to set their own rates, 
guided by treasury interest rates. A global income general sales tax was introduced, 
raising prices of energy and public enterprise production. Wage growth rates were 
restricted as well as a general reduction in public investment and subsidy cutbacks to 1% 
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of the GDP.108  
Real output growth recovered quickly after declining suddenly after the first years 
of the ERSAP.109 Since 1993/94, real GDP has grown steadily and was at 5% in 1996/97. 
Primary balances and government savings increased and the gap between savings and 
investment decreased. The overall deficit declined from 15% to 2% of the GDP.110 This 
reduction was achieved through an increase, representing a 42% turnaround in the overall 
deficit, and through expenditure reduction, accounting for 58% turnaround in the deficit.  
In terms of revenue, the exchange rate changes in 1991 aided in raising revenue 
from oil and Suez Canal receipts, as well as taxes on international trade. A sales tax was 
introduced to generate revenue as well. The government cut back on investments in 
electricity and the tourism sectors. Subsidies and transfers declined by 2.4% within 
current expenditures as well as modest reductions in wages and salaries.111 Throughout 
the nineties, the budget deficit decreased, foreign reserves increased, and the gross 
domestic product averaged annual growth of 4-5 percent. These numbers appear to 
confirm the rise in Egypt’s economic performance. However, it is also important to look 
at the qualitative effects of economic reform in terms of social development and poverty. 
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The Impact Of The Economy On Society 
One of the main priorities of these reforms was a reduction in government 
expenditure, resulting in a cut in social costs. This would, however, add to the recessional 
effects, as well as have a negative effect on wages, employment, and social services. 
Mubarak’s regime proposed a new Unified Labor Law which would “eliminate the job 
security gained by public sector workers from the Nasser era.”113 This was an important 
step towards expanding the private sector, with real wages in the private sector increasing 
by 16.6 percent.114 However, for many Egyptians, the security associated with public 
sector employment surpassed the value of private sector employment. However, the 
government maintained that the privatization and liberalization programs be focused on 
production and expansion of the market in order to make the economy better, which 
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would eventually make up for social costs of the first policies.115 The state undertook 
these reforms under the auspice that the protection of the poor was compatible with 
economic freedom. 
Yet, pressures for liberalizing included price increases affected railway tickets, 
electrical batteries, bus tickets, and school fees. The Planning and Budget Commission of 
the People’s assembly “recommended the elimination of free secondary and university 
education, and of subsidies for low-cost housing.”116 In order to cope with the social 
repercussions of economic reform and regional instability from the Gulf Crisis (return of 
migrants to the domestic economy), the government established the Social Fund for 
Development. The Fund invested in labor intensive public works to help combat 
unemployment, education and health programs, micro-loan and training enterprises, and 
job replacement programs. 117 
Furthermore, the Mubarak regime encouraged gradual reductions of the food 
subsidy program throughout the nineties, however this decline was reversed after a 
decade reaching a peak in 2004, accounting for 4.1 percent of total public spending, or 
1.7% of the GDP.118 This was largely due to the international food crisis in the early 21st 
century and the global in food prices worldwide. This rationale operates on the claim that 
food subsidies are effective in targeting the poor, while in the Egypt’s context; this is 
clearly not the case.119 There are huge leakages in the program due to inefficiency and 
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lack of proper targeting measures. The universal availability of such subsidies in Egypt, 
without regard to specific income or welfare levels, demonstrates the financially draining 
effect of the program. Thus, subsidies are often deemed fiscally wasteful and 
uneconomical. Even so, food subsidies, one of the most well known social safety nets in 
Egypt, remained relatively stable during Mubarak’s reign. One reason for this is that 
subsidies and other social welfare initiatives are used by the state to provide legitimacy 
through the social contract. 
 
Political And Economic Policies That Affect The Poor 
 While the reforms under Sadat and Mubarak saw some success in terms of debt 
reduction, controlled inflation, and economic growth, many scholars would argue that the 
social aspects were devastating.120 This presents a controversial framework in which to 
understand government reform initiatives and their role in poverty fluctuations. 
Economic interests are inextricably linked to the politics of welfare, development and 
poverty. However, the discourse of the Egyptian government, international donors, and 
economists on economic development, division of resources, and poverty alleviation 
projects become as sensitive and scrutinized as poverty research itself. Furthermore, one 
cannot exclude the numerous critical events that took place throughout the late 1990’s to 
2008. The 1998/99 world market crisis in Asia, the terrorist attacks that affected tourism 
in Egypt; the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent global economic fall out; 
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and their impact on regional economies; as well as the 
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2002/2003 financial problems which include the shortage of foreign currency, inactive 
monetary policy, high inflation, large deficits, and the declining GDP growth rates all 
impacted the economic circumstances in Egypt.121 These important economic events 
affected Egypt’s growth performance and therefore the socio-economic aspects of the 
population. 
 
Shifts And Transitions In State Policy 
The historical relationship between state and society has gradually changed from 
Nasser to Mubarak. Nasser’s social policies targeted the entire population, particularly 
the middle working class. Subsidies on basic food and nonfood commodities, free social 
service programs such as healthcare and education, and wage regulations were 
government methods to ensure agreement among the members of a society to cooperate 
for social benefits. Guaranteed employment in public sector industries was a tradeoff for 
complete autocratic authority and state control.  This changed slightly after Sadat; whose 
polices focused more on economic growth and the expansion of the private sector as 
means to promote social development through the economy. Yet growth and 
development were still primarily state led. Mubarak continued this tradition through 
structural adjustment and economic reform policies. These policies have also marked a 
shifting attitude towards the development and welfare of the population.  
As mentioned earlier, Nasser’s polices were not targeted specifically towards the 
poor. His reforms applied to the majority of the society. His laws were designed to 
increase state control and autonomy while promoting economic inclusion and social 
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cohesion. By developing and catering to a strong social base, his regime gained a strong 
political base.122 Free social services, a large-scale subsidy program, and guaranteed 
employment for graduates of secondary schools and universities defined the tenets of 
Nasser’s social contract with the people. This is not to say poverty was never an issue 
during this period, however he targeted the general welfare of his constituents, which 
may have represented a much broader group than the poor or ultra poor. His major social 
polices did not target poverty, but rather merged poverty alleviation with benefits for the 
majority of Egyptians.  
On the other hand, Sadat and Mubarak sought to address the problem of 
inequality and poverty reduction through the economic process and growth. Nasser’s 
approach towards state controlled welfare was unsustainable and Egypt could not 
continue to afford this generous social contract. Historically, poverty was not treated as a 
process, but a problem and often only addressed as a function of economic deprivation. 
Poverty, especially during Sadat’s time, was addressed through the economy as a limit of 
income, consumption, or expenditure. Increasing these indicators would increase welfare. 
Social reform was achieved through economic reform, the relationship between state and 
society changed dramatically. Economic reform would result in economic growth, which 
in turn, would benefit the population. However, in Egypt’s case, economic growth tended 
to reach the upper echelons of society first before eventually dispersing to the rest of the 
population, creating a “trickle down” effect, with the poor benefiting last and least 
proportionally from growth.123 Yet trickle down development is criticized for not 
adequately accounting for the poorest sectors of society; groups that are typically the 
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most sensitive to economic changes and who need the distributive benefits from growth 
the most. Furthermore, during the Sadat era, there was a lack of focus on developing 
human capital or investing in other assets such as health, education, employment, or 
targeted poverty reduction programs. Welfare and social programs were not effective and 
social spending was fiscally impractical. That, coupled with the lack of distributive gains 
from economic growth led to social instability and state’s capacity to help ensure the 
capability, welfare, and access for its citizens was diminished. 
In 2004, Ahmed Nazif, minister of communication and member of the National 
Democratic Party, was appointed head of a new cabinet that sought to continue the 
structural adjustment polices of the early nineties. Under these reforms, Egypt would 
appeal to a broader, market focused international base, which would subsequently attract 
more foreign investment, increase state capital, and eventually reach all strata of 
society.124 Privatization and economic liberalization polices were promoted throughout 
government development schemes. The Egyptian government has continued to play a 
dominant role in the economy despite pressures for deregulation, liberalization of the 
economy and the growth of the private sector. Even in the early nineties, when 
development focused on market-led growth as the prevailing method to encourage 
growth and reduce poverty, the Egyptian government did not fundamentally reform or 
restructure its economy. Rather, the state continues to take a gradual approach to any 
economic changes. 
For example, any financial liberalization and privatization polices were very 
gradual, a far cry from the sweeping economic reforms demanded by institutional backed 
restructuring. Even at this gradual pace, structural adjustment, economic reform, and 
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growth did little to promote stabilization, instead economically isolating a large part of 
the population.  
However, there were some substantial changes in social progress and poverty 
alleviation strategies in the past fifteen years. Instead of targeting the poor through 
economic gains or universal social protection schemes, the state has slowly made 
progress in addressing the needs of the poor through broadly targeted welfare programs, 
which will be examined later in this chapter. 
 
Human Development: Social Progress in Egypt 
The role of the Egyptian State is the primary factor in the direction and 
implementation of social and economic strategies. As mentioned before, poverty has been 
historically addressed through economic changes in Egypt as a mechanism for social 
betterment and progress.  
 According to Egyptian household income data, urban poverty had significantly 
increased from 1980 to 1990 while rural poverty had more than doubled.125 Poverty was 
rampant throughout the country. One major cause of this was the decline in oil revenues 
in the early eighties. Yet, the rate and severity of poverty in Egypt are seen as particularly 
high during this period as the focus on economic policies tended to surpass social 
welfare. Some would argue that general mismanagement and bureaucratic corruption 
were the primary culprits for the decline of societal welfare during this time although 
there was no reduction in subsidies or in access to services.126 Either way, this was a 
crucial period for Egypt not only in terms of economic reform, but social policy as well. 
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Several initiatives were, in fact, implemented in order to address rising socioeconomic 
problems, such as the expansion of the Ministry of Social Solidarity and the development 
of other social programs.  
 
Social Programs 
Social spending programs broadly include education, health, non-energy 
subsidies, and other social sectors. Social spending increased from an average of 7.5% of 
GDP between1996-2000 to approximately 9.8% between 2001-2005.127 Thus, it could be 
logically inferred that the increase in social welfare programs in addition to higher rates 
of economic growth would result in an overall decrease in poverty and welfare.  
In terms of education, the HDI reports that male literacy improved by 12 percent 
between 1996 and 2001 while female literacy improved by about 25 percent.128  Total 
literacy for adults over ten years has risen from 52.3% in 1994 to 65.7% in 2004. Net 
enrollment in primary education institutions rose from 85.5% in 1995 to 94% in 2005.129 
Furthermore, the ratio of girls to boys enrolled in both primary and secondary educational 
institutions increased from 1990/91 to 2000/01. 
According to the HDI, general health standards increased during time. Child and 
infant mortality rates declined, demonstrating some improvement in the health sector. 
Also, there was a rise in overall life expectancy rates, increasing from 47.5 in 1960-65 to 
68.0 in 2000-03. The percentage of births aided by medical personnel increased from 
47.6% in 1990 to 69.4% in 2003. The use of contraceptives increased during the same 
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time period.130 The prevalence of children under 5 years classified as underweight 
decreased from 9.9% in 1992 to 8.6% in 2003.131 The proportion of households with 
access to sustainable water resources has continuously increased throughout Egypt from 
1996 to 2004.132 
 “Expressed in numbers of deprived people, this decrease seems considerable when 
taking into consideration that the population has increased from 55.2 million in 1992 to 
69 million in 2004. Population without access to piped water has decreased from 12.1 
million in 1992 to 6.1 million in 2004. Between 1991 and 2004, children dying before age 
five decreased from 98.2 thousand to 28.6 thousand. During the same period, children 
not in basic or secondary schools decreased from 2.9 million to 1.6 million. Illiterate 
adults (15+) decreased between 1993 and 2004, from 18.9 to 16.2 million.  It remains to 
be seen if improvement on the national level has trickled down to close the regional and 
gender gaps.”133 
 The Egyptian Human Development Report recognizes these achievements during 
the nineties as evident and impressive. The report argues that their data reflects a general 
trend of human development improvement on the national level and that in terms of 
human deprivation, all aspect with the exception of unemployment have shown 
significant reductions over the last decade. Furthermore, “human deprivation reflects the 
fact that economic growth over the last decade has had an impact on those people who 
are economically disadvantaged.”134 
 Yet, a more realistic interpretation of the Human Development Indicator framework 
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is needed to understand changes in living standards and the quality of life for Egyptians 
during this time. For example, a high life expectancy rate does not automatically assure a 
good quality of life, nor equal access to social facilities. The quantitative nature of such 
measurement is merely an average, a number projected to assert qualitative claims.135  
Yet it can hardly claim an assertive, true to life representation of the quality of welfare.  
 Similarly, literacy rate percentages also prove difficult in understanding changes in 
education standards.  As Adams notes, “in many developing countries functional literacy 
is much lower than recorded literacy, and it is often not clear which variable is actually 
being measured.”136 Literacy, like poverty, is difficult to qualify and measure in terms of 
concrete statistics. What constitutes the proper level of fluency, especially in a country 
such as Egypt when the literacy level of formal modern standard Arabic is quite difficult 
or takes longer to attain.  While literacy levels have increased over time, universal 
literacy does not seem to be a priority for the Egyptian government, which spends over 
30% of the educational budget on universities alone. Primary education, the school when 
a child learns to read and write, is often disregarded in terms of public policy.137  
According to the HDI report, the link between human development corresponds 
directly with economic growth. It is interesting to note that while the HDI report paints an 
idyllic picture of Egypt in terms of both economic and social prosperity, it also neglects 
the massive socio-economic regional disparities in Egypt. This is especially apparent in 
terms of education and health rate comparisons between Upper and Lower Egypt, 
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demonstrating the uneven progression in Egyptian development.138 Inequality is often 
overshadowed by state led welfare gestures.  
 
Mubarak To Present: The Role Of The State 
Combating poverty was not a state priority for either Nasser or Sadat. However 
recently, the Mubarak regime has brought the issue front and center, representing a 
crucial platform for his National Democratic Party.  
“The NDP banks on the role of the state as the patron of society and the honest 
guardian of its values, potentialities and social security. It believes that the job of the 
state is to make suitable the atmosphere for development and strike a balance between 
the interests of society and the interests of individuals using the arm of law. The role of 
the state is also to assist low-income segments to attain their basic demands and give due 
care to people with special needs. The NDP, at the same time, has an unwavering belief 
in the importance of the continual modernization of state institutions for them to be able 
to carry out their development-related duties perfectly.”139  
The importance of the economy in Egypt cannot be ignored when discussing the 
role of the state and the capacity of society. The Egyptian Government has continued to 
play a dominant role in the economy despite pressures for deregulation, liberalization of 
the economy and the growth of the private sector. “It is not merely a characteristic of the 
Sadat era, but of all the years since 1967—and thus of Nasser’s era as well—that 
Egyptian leaders have steadfastly attempted to give the impression of movement while 
carefully avoiding the agonizing choices inherent in the current situation of no war, no 
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peace.”140 
For example, throughout the early nineties, when development focused on 
market-led growth as the prevailing method to encourage growth and reduce poverty, the 
Egyptian Government did not fundamentally reform or restructure its economy. Instead, 
the state promoted a gradual approach to any economic changes, which it continues 
today. Is this good for the ultra poor? According to poverty analysis, while general 
poverty has decreased and social protection measures have expanded, inequality has 
remained fairly stable from 1990-2005.141  This is not a result of active and efficient 
polices of the state, but rather a gradual evolution in society. 
Yet one can argue that, even at this gradual pace, structural adjustment, economic 
reform, and growth did not promote stabilization, instead economically isolating a large 
part of the population, the ultra poor feeling the brunt of these policies.142 Thus, it is 
plausible that the success in decreasing general poverty rates shadows the negative 
impacts felt by the ultra poor. Was this a conscious decision to ignore the ultra poor by 
the government? This thesis argues that historically, Egypt has largely followed a state 
led growth process with policies that often serve the interest of the polity, it was not until 
late in Mubarak’s era that the state attempted to actively target poverty in its polices. 
While perhaps not a conscious decision, the government did not actively address the 
issues of ultra impoverishment, instead reflecting on the overall welfare of society. 
However, while both economy and society progressed to some extent throughout the 
nineties, the government recognized that many of it’s polices did not cater to those who 
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needed it most. Many institutions have been put into place and several polices have 
become more targeted for effectiveness (which will be further elaborated in the next 
chapter) to give attention to the poor in society. 
 
Conclusion 
“It has always been the gift of politicians in all countries to redefine issue in such 
a way that the real choices and options are obscured. There is nothing so distasteful to a 
politician as making choices, especial when the adoption of option A cannot be 
reconciled with option B.”143  
State leadership and cooperation is crucial in the implementation and success of 
any antipoverty strategy. The relationship between people and state is determined by a 
combination of many dynamic factors that depend strongly on external and domestic 
influences. Rising poverty rates are a function of the macro-economy, state policies, 
opportunities at home and abroad, and existing welfare regimes and the transfers of 
public goods. This thesis looks primarily at the internal aspects of the power relations 
between different political structures and its impact on the welfare of the population. 
Government, domestic institutions, civil society, and the role of a powerful bureaucracy, 
play a significant part in the application and effectiveness of poverty reduction and social 
protection policies. Furthermore, during the 1980’s and 1990’s, the role of donors and the 
international community became more involved in development and poverty alleviation 
schemes. In order to understand how the government targets the ultra poor, one must look 
how their general role as the State can or does affect the most marginalized section in 
society.  
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Poverty has since become a national issue with the state attempting to counter it 
on several different levels. This has marked a shift from older, traditional methods for 
targeting poverty (through increasing income or GDP) and are replaced by more modern 
methods (for example the Human Development Indicator frameworks, reports and 
programs from the Ministry of Social Solidarity, as well as current poverty research in 
Egypt) for understanding the process and these new methodologies are becoming more 
integrated in state policy. 
For example, the Social Fund for Development, established in 1991, has based its 
principles on not only income generating initiatives, but through employment, 
institutional cooperation, social and civil awareness and access to financial capital.144 
Capacity building, rather than income generation is the new platform for poverty 
alleviation and social programs. Furthermore, this institution does not target deprivation 
through poverty reduction programs only, but seeks to address social betterment through 
national development and employment as well. Many of these initiatives mark an 
increasing trend in policy and government programs to address poverty in a more 
comprehensive manner. Poverty reduction is not merely a matter of social policies that 
benefit the broader population (Nasser) or a factor of economic growth (Sadat and early 
Mubarak) but as a multidimensional process that addresses the complexities of 
deprivation. There are many other initiatives such as the Productive Families Program, 
which began in 1964 to help improve the living standards of impoverished women by 
providing services and capital in small-scale enterprises. Programs such as the Mubarak 
Social Solidarity Program and Nasser Social Bank also provide financing and micro 
lending to generate income for the poor.  These programs focus on income generation for 
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government social interventions. The Ministry of Social Solidarity demonstrates the 
importance of human development, civil society, and the ultra poor in government 
policies. These programs and initiatives will be further discussed in chapter three. 
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Chapter Three 
 
POLICIES OF THE STATE THAT AFFECT THE POOR: 
EGYPT AS A TRANSITIONING WELFARE STATE? 
 
The last chapter focused on the historical social contract between the Egyptian 
Government and its people. This chapter will examine the policies and government 
initiatives that affect the poor in the social, political, and economic spheres. In order to 
understand the policies and objectives of the state towards the poor, it is important to 
examine the social and political models that reflect the kinds of choices society and state 
make to provide welfare. To what extent has this model changed under Nasser’s socialist 
authoritarian regime, Sadat’s attempt at a liberal rentier economy, and Mubarak’s 
extension of free market capitalist polices and his attempts to embrace welfare reforms?  
This chapter focuses on the policies of the government that affect the poor. First, 
this is examined within the historical framework presented in chapter two and focuses on 
the conditions of the poor within a particular regime. An analysis of the different 
mechanisms for poverty reduction within the state, such as entitlements, services, 
provisions, subsidies, incentives, and welfare will provide the framework. Second, this 
chapter will contextualize the theoretical criteria for a welfare state and Egypt’s 
attempted transition from a rentier state to a welfare state. In order to establish this 
transition, the role of rentier economics and Washington Consensus style development 
will be examined as important factors that contributed to state polices and behavior in 
society. Third, state initiatives in social services (such as healthcare education, and social 
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protection) are addressed in the context of the state’s role in a new social contract.    
According to the Egyptian constitution, the State’s responsibility to its citizens 
includes guaranteeing equality of opportunity to all Egyptians (Article 8) and 
guaranteeing cultural, social and health services (Article 16). Furthermore, Article 7 
claims that social solidarity is the basis of Egyptian society. The constitution also asserts 
that both work and education are rights guaranteed by the state (Article 13 and 18). These 
are a few of the rights and services constitutionally guaranteed to all Egyptians as a 
broader part of the social contract between citizens and state. 145 
To what degree do these articles extend? Do they reflect a reality of welfare and 
services to the population? Do the state’s responsibilities lie primarily with those in need? 
What forms the basis of solidarity amongst the government and the population? 
In the past twenty years, the Egyptian State has made public its intention to focus 
on social policy, by giving it high priority alongside economic growth. Evidence of this 
new focus can be found in budget allocations for expanded infrastructure in poorer 
regions and in initiatives to introduce universal pension and health insurance schemes. 
The government has also promoted social reforms in order to provide better access to 
basic services and opportunities, along with accountability, transparency and to some 
extent, freedom of expression.146 But to what degree is this successful? Have any tangible 
changes been made? This chapter will focus on tracing the changes in social policies of 
Egypt and what they mean in terms of a feasible political model in Egypt.  
. 
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Egypt as a Transitioning Welfare State? 
The last chapter concentrated on historicizing the social contract in Egypt.  Nasser 
sought to reform Egypt under a ‘socialist state’ structure in order to consolidate 
government power. Sadat implemented different policies in order to achieve a more 
capitalist free market state, without reforming the political structure. Although Mubarak 
continued similar policies early in his reign, he has taken steps to increase social 
protection and welfare programs during the last few years. During the last two presidents, 
Egypt has attempted to transition from a rentier capitalist regime to a capitalist welfare 
state. The state under Mubarak has tried to embrace more welfare-oriented polices while 
retaining capitalist, neoliberal, and privatization strategies. In theory, the goal has been to 
merge these ideas together to achieve sustainable, equitable, efficient, and properly 
targeted social policies. In reality, what has emerged is an uncomfortable paradox of 
social, political, and economic contradictions between the Egyptian state and its 
population. In order to assess the issues relating to state responsibility and society, 
several questions must be addressed. Has the government ever fundamentally changed its 
infrastructure to implement pro-poor and social reforms over time? Did social policy 
truly improve? Is Egypt transitioning into a welfare state? Is the government effective in 
catering to the needs of the poor? 
This thesis does not operate under the assumption that a welfare state is 
necessarily the final solution to alleviate poverty. Instead, it looks at the particular criteria 
and policy making of the government in addressing the welfare of its citizens under 
certain socio-political models. Before this issue can be understood, several concepts need 
to be elaborated on. 
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The Role of Poor Within a Regime: Mechanisms for Poverty Reduction 
Entitlements, and Incentives 
Entitlements are the rights and privileges of any citizen or the legislative 
provisions given to a population by its government. An individual has a certain level of 
entitlement and exchange, which is influenced by outside factors, such as cost of 
resources, economic conditions, the availability of employment and wage rates. The state 
is responsible for ensuring these social rights by providing equal access, distribution, and 
opportunity to all its citizens. “Social rights are necessary because the lack of material 
resources could prevent an individual from becoming an autonomous economic agent or 
a competent political actor; they are feasible through a system of mutual insurance 
against measurable contingencies and risks.”147 
However, there is a distinct line between what citizens ‘should’ receive and what 
they actually do receive. Although a state may endorse a service that it deems necessary 
and socially just. But this does not automatically guarantee equal access or quality of the 
service. In Egypt, a public and free school system is seen as essential to encourage 
education programs for every citizen. Yet the government’s commitment to providing 
education as a universal good has had significant costs. The quality of public schools are 
substandard and they are renowned for being inefficient and unproductive. Should quality 
of service be sacrificed for universal access?   
 
Mechanisms for Entitlement and Provisions 
Entitlement programs include social and income security, social protection, 
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healthcare, and education. Entitlement and provisions for the poor and vulnerable can be 
classified into different functional mechanisms. Prevention mechanisms aid in reducing 
the probability of social shocks; mitigation mechanisms reduce the magnitude of their 
impact; and coping mechanisms relieve the impact once the shock has materialized.148 
Programs such as social insurance, social security, labor market interventions and social 
assistance, all are mechanisms for societal entitlement. A citizen’s entitlement stems from 
two prevailing factors: equal membership (we are all Egyptian citizens) and from 
acknowledged needs (disabled, single parents, or other groups that need social 
entitlements more than others.)149  
“Although individuals, should, in principle, themselves be responsible for 
insurance against social risks, governments are also called upon to take responsibility for 
their citizens social protection when necessary. Often a household is unwilling or unable 
to take sufficient precautions and state intervention is required to restore the economy’s 
allocative efficiency and distributive justice. However, the state’s social security strategy 
must be efficient and just in and of itself.”150 Services and entitlements are factors that 
contribute to the regulation of a society.  
 
Incentives and Welfare 
Welfare programs and state-sponsored social initiatives can create serious 
problems of dependency. Many of these programs are expensive and their sustainability 
requires a certain measure of success in poverty alleviation. Ideally, the intent of welfare 
                                                
148  Loewe, Markus. "Social Security in Egypt: An Analysis and Agenda for Policy Reform." Economic 
Research Forum: Working Papers. 2024. (2000): 5. 
149  Jordan, 75. 
150  Loewe, 5. 
 84 
 
services works under the assumption that recipients will eventually achieve self-
sufficiency. Welfare programs should not be structured to continuously exhaust state 
funds or put pressure on society. Social programs are often targeted as facilitating social 
dependency on the state and draining state resources. To offset certain welfare initiatives, 
such as subsidies, incentive plans are often introduced to balance out social provisions 
and justify the affordability of social spending.  
 Because progress and social development are critical to the long-term goals of 
welfare, it cannot be one-sided on the behalf of the state. Therefore, incentives must be 
put in place to discourage dependency and encourage responsibility and human 
capacity.151 Incentives can be in the form of conditional welfare whereby an eligible 
recipient must meet certain requirements. For example, they must enroll their children in 
school, register with an unemployment office, maintain steady employment, apply and be 
screened for social housing, and other development incentives. This discourages reliance 
on the system and voluntary unemployment.  
 
Subsidies 
 Food subsidies have been used by many governments, including Egypt, as a form 
of poverty alleviation and as an extension of the social contract. Targeting addresses the 
issue of how the system will provide the subsidized commodity and for whom it is 
intended. This can be through either administrative or self-targeting program. 
Administrative targeting involves a substantial role on the part of the state to set up an 
                                                
151  Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, . "Growing Unequal? Income Distribution 
and Poverty in OECD Countries." OECD Report. (2008). 
 85 
 
effective and accountable infrastructure.152 A functional and accountable administration 
will facilitate the screening of the poor from the non-poor, the distribution of food stamps 
and deliverance of income transfers to those who are qualified. The administration would 
hold the responsibility of identifying and targeting those in need, as well as delivering 
and distributing the subsidy, either directly or through ration cards. Transparency and 
cooperation would be required for administrative targeting to be successful—a daunting 
task. 
 Another method to select beneficiaries for subsidies is through self-targeting. “Food 
subsidies can be considered to be self-targeted when the subsidized item is an inferior 
good; that is, the food is consumed more in both absolute and relative terms by the poor 
than by the non-poor.”153 Food subsidies in Egypt provide “cheap, calorie dense foods to 
protect the income and nutritional status of particular groups such as the poor, children, 
and pregnant mothers.” In Egypt, however, subsidized inferior goods such as coarse flour 
and Baladi bread are universally available and acceptable to all citizens. This has led to 
major leakages and inefficient targeting because non-poor families also have the same 
access to the subsidy. 
 Food subsidies and their political and distributional impacts play a significant role 
in Egyptian social safety net programs; the low-income population has come to rely on 
this program for their socio-economic welfare.154 For many households in Egypt, the 
bread subsidy is the primary method to ensure that they are able to afford food for 
themselves and their families.  
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 Since its inception in the 1940s, the operation and evolution of the Egyptian 
subsidy program has gone through many distinct transformations. The food subsidy 
program did not originally target the poor when it was first created, but was another 
public benefit for every Egyptian citizen under Nasser. By 1975, subsidies accounted for 
almost 17% of government expenditures.155 The subsidy system continued to grow to an 
unsustainable level in the 1980s when it expanded to almost 20 foods categories available 
to all Egyptians. Since then, the subsidy system has quietly contracted from 20 food types 
to just 4. However, there are still huge leakages in the program due to inefficiency and 
lack of proper targeting measures. The universal availability of such subsidies in Egypt, 
without regard to specific income or welfare levels, demonstrates the financially draining 
effect of the program. Thus, subsidies are often deemed fiscally wasteful and 
uneconomical.  
 The subsidy system in Egypt attracted criticism from financial international 
institutions.156 Western style capitalist development proponents argue that, because of the 
general ineffectiveness and subsidy leakage problems, the fiscal costs of maintaining the 
program outweighs the social benefits. They advocate the gradually elimination of the 
subsidy programs because of the unnecessary burden placed on the public budget.157 Yet, 
the political sensitivity of subsidies, especially bread, has put the State in an awkward 
position: balancing the desire to achieve economic pragmatism without creating domestic 
tension. While the Egyptian Government has in effect paid lip service to embracing 
affordable social spending, the food subsidy program has remained stable.  Regardless of 
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the pressure to eliminate or reform the subsidy system, the state has been curiously 
inactive by neither reducing or expanding the system nor addressing critical targeting 
problems. There was a steady and slow decline in subsidy social expenditure after 1992, 
although per capita share of subsidies did increase.  
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Social Protection 
Social protection programs are tools used by governments to alleviate poverty by 
reducing the vulnerability and risks of the poor, while at the same time increasing the 
opportunities and capabilities of those in need. These programs target low income and 
ultra poor groups. They promote poverty mitigation and social assistance while 
attempting to achieve financially viable and effective social protection systems.159 For 
example, in Egypt, income supplements and support systems are in place as a part of 
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social protection and poverty alleviation strategies. Social protection programs include 
policies that bolster the role of the poor in the labor market and target socially 
marginalized citizens such as women, children and the disable. They also promote local 
business development and access to social insurance and welfare services.160 
There are also other social policies that help the capabilities and development of 
the poor. Labor policies are extremely important in the direction and success of social 
protection. Minimum wage, public sector or minority employment opportunities, and the 
protection of workers play a significant role in the security and rights of the citizen. 
Social insurance also provides security for those who face social risks, providing 
management for the unemployed, disable, retired, or those who become ill.161 Welfare 
assistance programs target the most vulnerable giving those in need support and 
protection. Microfinance and local business investment programs can also be used as 
social protection measures at the community level. These programs offer loans and 
initiatives to low-income groups as a means to bolster their capacity and access to 
financial services. In these government implemented social protection programs, the state 
takes on the role of the protector. 
These different aspects of social protection help define the responsibilities of the 
state toward society. The extent in which these programs are implemented and how they 
fare in success can shed light on the Egyptian government’s transitioning role in society 
and how the poor are affected. By examining this role, one can understand the criteria for 
a welfare state and whether Egypt, during the past three presidents has actively pursued a 
shift in policy alleviate poverty. 
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The Welfare State 
At the minimum level, a welfare state depends on the government as the primary 
actor in facilitating the social, political, and economic well being of its population. A 
public responsibility exists between government and citizen—social and economic 
equality, fair distribution, and minimal provisions for living standards. The state assumes 
responsibility for the widening disparities in terms of inequality, social protection, 
opportunity, entitlements, services, and incentives. A welfare state “involves state 
responsibility for securing some basic modicum of welfare for its citizens. Such a 
definition skirts the issue of whether social policies are emancipatory or not; whether 
they help system legitimation or not; whether they contradict or aid the market process; 
and what, indeed, is meant by basic?”162 Welfare sociologist Gøsta Epsing Anderson 
raises important questions, not just in terms of a welfare state, but also in regard to the 
actual role of state responsibility to its citizens. Is a state required to meet the needs of a 
population? And are everyone’s basic welfare needs the same? 
“Most historical regime shifts have one thing in common, namely an 
intensification of ideological competition between rival visions of the ‘Good Society’.”163 
The policies implemented under Nasser were less about social solidarity, nationalization, 
or welfare and more about consolidating the power of the regime. As previously 
mentioned, the dominant role of the state did not change fundamentally with Nasser’s 
state autonomous socialism, Sadat’s capitalist rentier economy, or Mubarak’s post 
capitalist policies.  
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The remainder of this chapter will focus on Egypt in the last thirty years and the 
government’s attempts to transition from a rentier state to a welfare state. This will shed 
light on the government’s attitudes and commitments towards the ultra poor. 
 
Rentier Economies 
A rentier state rarely promotes economic development; it essentially allows the 
government a certain degree of domestic autonomy due to its monopoly on economic 
power. This was the case under Sadat’s government. During this era, Egypt relied heavily 
on foreign aid, revenue from the Suez Canal, and on exporting labor and the return of 
remittances.164 The economy relied heavily on foreign grants, worker remittances, oil 
revenue, and tourism.165 This money accounted for a huge portion of the GDP in the mid-
1980s and left Egypt financially dependent, internally oriented and weak. This led to a 
rentier effect. While remittances did facilitate employment and revenue, the real need to 
address economic reform and the demands from the population were not acknowledged 
by the state. The result was an economy which was extremely susceptible to external 
shocks and had difficulties maintaining a positive economic growth rate. Therefore, 
Egypt accumulated massive deficits in both foreign debt and balance of payments. The 
reliance of interregional migration during the 1980’s promoted an environment in which 
the state could remain negligent and apathetic in instituting real economic or social 
changes. Sadat attempted to fix the problem through the economy, rather than society.  
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Role of International Donors and Foreign Aid 
Foreign aid policy in the 1980s reflect “the cumulative effects of decades of 
borrowing and manifested by large and increasing balance-of-payments and budget 
deficits in most of the developing world”166 This, along with other factors, marked the 
beginning of extensive changes and reforms in international donors and aid strategy. 
Equilibrium, both externally through balance of payments and internally through national 
budgets, became the target for aid objectives. To counter unsustainable rent seeking 
policies, Sadat tried to embrace free market and privatization principles that foreign 
donors so vigorously promoted. This was done in superficial conformity with western 
style capitalist reform, which also extended to Mubarak’s early reform efforts. 
 This era of economic reform sought to promote a more outward oriented approach 
and relied on deregulation and liberalization programs. These policies were an extension 
of the Washington Consensus economic and social development programs that extend 
from Sadat to early Mubarak’s era.  
 
Washington Consensus Reform 
 Throughout Egypt in the eighties and nineties, new socioeconomic policies 
attempted to adhere to the Washington Consensus style of reform. The Washington 
Consensus developed during the 1980’s as a branch of neoclassical economics, which 
emphasized capital intensive development.167 It promoted right-wing, conservative 
development policies that operated on the assumption that the “market is efficient and the 
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state is inefficient.”168 This school of thought promoted strict and specific economic 
prescriptions, such as reliance on deregulation, fiscal discipline, direct foreign 
investment, trade liberalization, and privatization of state operated programs. However, 
the deviation from this model and the subsequent success of several East Asian 
economies, along with the negative impact of human costs and increases in poverty for 
other states that implemented such polices, presented challenges to this theory. The 
“Washington Consensus policies focus inordinately on short term stabilization while 
undercutting the basis for long term growth.”169   
This was applied to Egypt to counter the inward-looking, heavily regulated, and 
interventionist political economy of the state, as well as to challenge the over reliance on 
rents. Washington Consensus international financial institutions argued that state 
centralization policies were unproductive; therefore, liberalizing and privatizing the 
economy would bring profitable and effective results. In terms of welfare, the 
Washington Consensus approach operated on the conclusion that economic growth 
reaches the upper echelons of society first before eventually dispersing to the rest of the 
population. Eventually, the growth from this “trickle down” effect would indirectly 
benefit the poor.170 Socio-economic inequalities would subsequently be minimized 
through the trickle down effect of market revenue. 
Mubarak sought to continue the Washington Consensus style development and 
integration.171 The best example of this is the economic reform and structural adjustment 
programs of the early nineties. These policies operated under the assumption that once 
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prices and institutional barriers were deregulated, the private sector and new investors 
would utilize comparative advantage through the market. Believing that state-owned 
enterprises were detrimental to growth, the ERSAP followed the strategy that economic 
growth and development would thrive in a market competitive economy free of 
government restriction. Given this opportunity, the supply-side of the economy would 
respond appropriately. Theoretically, socio-economic inequalities would subsequently be 
minimized through the trickle down effect of market revenue.172  
The Asian crisis in 1997-98 and subsequent global economic fallout showed how 
disconnected Egypt was from the modern capitalist infrastructure of a globalized 
economy.173 Although social expenditure continued to increase, GDP annual growth was 
also not critically affected, due to the lack of integrated economic and social policies 
were supposed to take place in the early nineties. It also demonstrated how Egypt relied 
on the informal sector, which was not tied to global enterprises or international free 
market cooperation. 
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Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files 
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One of the primary purposes Mubarak’s agenda was to transform the Egyptian 
economy into a more market-focused system. This would relieve rising fiscal imbalances 
and distortions in the current economy by adjusting and reforming the public sector, 
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monetary policies, social policies, investment, exchange rates, trade liberalization, budget 
reduction, balance of payments, and domestic prices.  
 
Social Services for the Poor in Egypt: Healthcare and Education 
Free public healthcare and education are two examples of government services 
which have historically been granted to the Egyptian population. Nasser “resorted to 
health services as a conduit for ideological messages.”175 Although Sadat emphasized 
privatization and “personal initiatives, the state support of healthcare was not abandoned, 
given the great symbolic value of healthcare in politics.176 Governmental health care 
programs, such as subsidized health services, are financed through general revenues and a 
social health insurance system administered through the Health Insurance Organization. 
The public healthcare sector can be categorized as facilities owned and operated by the 
Ministry of Health and Population, other government medical centers such as military or 
university clinics, or public institutions such as the Health Insurance Organization.177 The 
services provided by the Ministry of Health are available mostly free of cost to all 
citizens. Even though these mechanisms are in place, quality is a notable problem. 
Government support is minimal and divided, which results in a general absence of real 
effectiveness and quality.  
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Healthcare 
In Egypt, as in many other countries, health care services are provided unequally 
to different demographic and social groups. In Egypt, 57% of health care expenditures 
are paid directly out of pocket which can be attributed to the poor quality of government 
healthcare.178 Because public healthcare is inefficient and not properly targeted, primary 
care is usually sought through the private sector. It is significant to note the rising trend 
of household expenditure increases in direct, out of pocket payment to private health care 
providers and pharmacies. According to a report published in 2004, for the years 
1994/95: 
“Less than 60% of MOF funds were actually spent in MOHP facilities. The rest 
was transferred to teaching and university hospitals, HIO and CCO. MOHP facilities thus 
only received 19% of all health sector resources, or 0.7% of GDP. Of all resources, 56% 
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were spent in the private sector, most of it for the purchase of drugs (63%) or paying for 
private ambulatory care (17%). Less than 10% of private funds were used to purchase 
inpatient care”179  
As a result, there was been unequal access to healthcare, with low-income or poor 
households unable to afford quality healthcare. This inequality demonstrates that wealthy 
households can afford proper care, while the poor are left with little public funding.  This 
lack of funding for the poor results in minimal health care, which may lead to more 
severe long-term health problems. Those that can afford private care are turning away 
from public healthcare because of the deteriorating quality and “must turn to private 
suppliers for health and education services, or else forgo them.”180 Many Egyptians have 
used other healthcare facilities, such as clinics because, as an alternative to government 
or private healthcare providers, they provide better quality and care, have better 
equipment, and hire specialized physicians.181   
Religious charity such as zakat, or tithing, as well as waqf endowments are 
important within religious charitable organizations to help fund and support public 
institutions such as schools and hospitals. However, these practices “have all but 
disappeared in Egypt, a combination of government interference and lack of 
contemporary understanding of this form of endowed giving.”182 Yet the organization and 
implementation of zakat and waqf have helped direct resources to maintaining some 
public services and goods to the impoverished and have helped fill in some of the social 
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gaps overlooked by the government.183 
Yet these public services offered by Islamic organizations have been given carte 
blanche. “In addition to the Ministry of Interior’s supervision of financial contributions to 
Islamic philanthropic organizations, such organizations are subject to tight bureaucratic 
controls. The increase of state aid to Islamic private organizations and their eventual 
annexation represent additional means of tightening government regulation. In short, the 
state encourages Islamic service organizations to the extent that it considers their services 
to be a contribution toward placating the masses, but it always keeps these organizations 
under surveillance through various governmental agencies.”184 
While the system itself has remained the same, trends in healthcare access have 
not. Poor household’s expenditure on healthcare dramatically exceeds that of middle 
class or wealthy households in terms of proportion of household income level.  
 Additionally, low-income populations spend more on health expenditures than 
before the economic reform. The share of health expenditure in total expenditure of low-
income groups has steadily increased from 1.8% in 1990 to 2.2% in 2004.185 The most 
drastic increases in health expenditures were especially evident in rural areas.  
 
Education 
“Education is without doubt a valuable asset for the Egyptian poor. Since the 
sixties the Government of Egypt has made great strides to universalize basic education 
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through large investments and by making education compulsory and free.”186 However, 
issues of quality, efficiency and access to education by marginalized groups have been 
major issues in the education sector. 
 Universal public education, especially at the elementary level, is lacking in both 
quality and effectiveness. Classrooms are often crowded, decrepit, and minimally funded 
facilities, with understaffed and overworked teachers, as well as minimal learning 
materials and limited supplies for classes.187 According to a report in 1995, only 30% of 
students in primary school attend classes on a regular full day basis. Classes average 
almost 50 students per teacher, with inner city ratios increasing to 100. Drop out and 
repetition rates are between 25-35%, and achievements in basic literacy and arithmetic 
are very low.188 
 The problems of access and quality that exist within Egyptian public education 
has led to families, especially who can easily afford it, to send their children to private 
schools or hire private tutors. In order to compensate for the deteriorating quality in 
public institutions, there have been dramatic increases in household private expenditures 
in education; beginning in 1990. Low-income groups represent the greatest proportional 
increase.189 According to data from the Institute of National Planning, poor groups spend 
approximately 19.7% of household total spending on education alone, placing an 
enormous burden on family finances. This is important because education is often linked 
directly to employment, which is subsequently linked to a higher standard of living and 
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general welfare. If poorer households cannot manage educational costs for their children, 
they are more likely to remain in poverty.  
To further illustrate the effects of indirect privatization, Mariz Tadros presents a 
micro-case study of the effects of informal private tutoring educational systems in the 
densely populated community in Cairo, Bulaq el Dakrour. According to the Tadros’ 
qualitative research, “out of class tutoring has become virtually obligatory for all 
students, rich and poor” for this community.190. 
 Although households still continue to use public schools, as demonstrated by the 
increases in public educational enrollment, they are often supplemented with private 
lessons, leading to an indirect privatization of the education system. The growing reliance 
on private tutoring and lessons has subsequently has placed socioeconomic pressure on 
low income households.191 In terms of informal education, “Even if poor people chose to 
pay the increased fees, it might be that they would be replacing their consumption of 
other goods which we would prefer them to retain.”192   
The state still has retained power over certain welfare services despite the 
extensive economic reform policies of the nineties. The deteriorating capacity to 
administer provisional free health and educational services has led most citizens to turn to 
private institutions. However, some remarkable strides have been made in the 
development and coordination of education in Upper Egypt. The Community Schools 
Project has sought to increase the access and availability of education in Upper Egypt. 
This includes pilot schools, peer teaching, community based curriculums and adult 
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literacy classes. In 1995, 125 community schools were opened and are operational. Many 
state reforms have sought to improve the quality and efficiency of basic education 
through programs such as the Agency for the Eradication of Illiteracy, the 5-year plan to 
achieve universal primary education, and other community based programs.193 
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New Social Contract? 
Recently, the government of Egypt has undertaken many initiatives that directly 
target the welfare of society and the poor. The latter half of Mubarak’s reign marked a 
staggered change between social citizenship and social rights.  
Social insurance and social security systems consist of monthly cash transfers and 
financial assistance to the retired, youth pensions, and relief aid. Over the years, the 
government has increased the allotments of social security programs. In terms of social 
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care, the state has 78 development projects which target families and children and include 
investments in nurseries, libraries, youth clubs, centers for rural children, and early 
childhood development programs. Some of the ongoing social protection programs target 
specific and vulnerable groups of society. There are also programs such as the substitute 
care families’ projects, which seek to reduce child labor and extend care to working 
children. The Cottage Family’s project targets the development of economic resources of 
low-income families. In 2005, 1.8 million benefited from this project with over 12,000 
more families joining the project in 2006. The Nasser Social Bank, through its 89 
branches, seeks to expand social solidarity base through loans and aid for the poor.195 The 
National Social Housing Program makes residential provisions for low to middle income 
Egyptians. 
Many of these programs fall under social protection—the state taking 
responsibility for the most marginalized groups of society. While this thesis 
acknowledges that these programs are not perfect and should be reformed, these 
initiatives mark a new period of social development in Egypt.  
Other current social protection measures include cash assistance transfers for 
those who need urgent emergency assistance, those who are retired, and those who have 
mental disabilities. There is also assistance for families of martyrs and injured civilians or 
in other special situations. The social security program provided children pensions 
benefiting over forty two thousand families in 2008 and 2009 alone, while aid for 
emergency situations has reached over twenty eight thousand families. General social 
security distributed on a monthly basis, which targeted needy situations and provided 
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benefits for over seventy one thousand families.196  
The state has also targeted those most vulnerable and impoverished through many 
which have specific provisions for orphans or children who work. Programs such as the 
Family Insurance Fund, under the Nasser Social Bank, targets those who have no 
provider, such as women and children. Initiatives such as this mark a transition in the 
government’s agenda to target specific and marginalized demographic groups that are at a 
high risk for deprivation.  
 Other projects such as the National Program for Improving the Poorest 1000 
Villages is an admirable example of a government led public works initiative targeting 
the ultra poor in Egypt. Several Ministries, including the Ministries of Social Solidarity, 
Housing, Education, Health, Economic Development, and Electricity, are working in 
conjunction with each other to specifically address the situation and circumstances of the 
most severely impoverished villages in Egypt. This program was developed using 
demographic poverty indicators such as employment, health, utilities and education in 
order to create an effective, multidimensional poverty map. This program reaches over 
one million poor households, who are chosen for a significant level of investment in an 
integrated package of basic services. “The program aims to create a sustained improved 
livelihood for the residents of these 1000 villages by increasing the availability of and 
accessibility to basic services as well as improving service delivery that is affordable and 
equitable and reducing poverty and vulnerability of the most unprivileged groups in these 
villages.” 197 
Another similar government program is the National Geographical Targeting of 
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Poverty, which, similar to the 1000 Villages project, aims to address the standard of 
living and welfare of the ultra poor. This project is intended to develop “the formal 
education infrastructure, conduct literacy classes, develop health and new housing units, 
provide potable water, sanitation, electricity, and roads, and improve environmental 
conditions in areas of highest poverty and greatest need in Egypt.”198 3.4 billion Egyptian 
pounds were invested to modernize and develop 151 villages in the first phase of the 
project and 158 interventions will be completed in the future.  
The New Cities Development Program, with 354 project centers in Egypt, is 
another low-income oriented project that seeks to provide training programs, funding, 
and entrepreneurship among deprived groups of society, breaking the cycles of poverty 
and helping the poor help themselves. The total number of beneficiaries reached two 
million people. This program demonstrates some of the major changes within the 
government in its attempt to target and understand not only the symptoms, but also the 
causes of poverty in Egypt.   
The Conditional Cash Transfer Program is one of the most recent ongoing pilot 
programs for ultra poor families. This program provides needy and qualified families 
with a cash transfer from the government in exchange for meeting certain conditions such 
as health and education criteria.  All pregnant women are required to get prenatal care, 
children under a certain age are required to go to school, and children are required to get 
vaccinations in order to receive the transfer.199 
This program has great potential for Egypt for many reasons. First, the main 
commodity transfer is income. While this thesis argues that income is a limited method 
                                                
198  United Nations Development Program and the Institute of National Planning, Egypt. Egypt Human 
Development Report 2010: Youth in Egypt: Building our Future. 
199  AUC Social Research Center. "Introducing Empowering Conditional Cash Transfers to Egypt." 
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for understanding poverty, it is still one of the most common and strongest indicators of 
deprivation. Therefore, the government is integrating some of the orthodox poverty 
alleviation strategies with new ideas. The conditional aspect of the CCT program is what 
gives this initiative’s potential a realistic foundation.  
Second, this program is that it has had some success in targeting and reducing 
poverty conditions in several regions with similar socioeconomic and political 
backgrounds as Egypt. For example, many Latin and South American countries (who 
have adopted variations of structural adjustment, economic reform, or have problems 
with extreme poverty) have engaged in CCT programs, as well as Yemen, Turkey, and 
Morocco. The positive impact of the CCT programs in these regions demonstrates that 
this could help to address the cycle of poverty and the needs of the severely 
impoverished. 
The intentions behind programs and projects such as these demonstrate a new era 
of social reform and initiatives led by the government. They seek to rectify issues with 
past social programs through more effective targeting, multidimensional poverty 
mapping, and conditionality standards to help ensure their success. No strategy is without 
fault, but this program demonstrates a forward looking objective and strategy of the state 
in terms of social protection. However, the question remains: to what extent will the 
government truly and fundamentally apply welfare, protection, and service reforms? 
Strides in rhetoric and dialogue are, indeed, the first steps, however the culmination of 
inaction by the government and its organizations have led to a “too little, too late” 
response by Egyptian citizens. This has been exemplified in the recent revolution on the 
25th of January, which demonstrated the importance of social equity, reform, and change 
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between Egyptians and their government.  
This revolution brings to light a significant debate regarding the nature and 
significance of poverty in Egypt in reference to existing political and social structures. 
The role of the Egyptian state is the primary factor in the direction and implementation of 
social and economic strategies. Also, the Egyptian government continues to play a 
dominant role in the socioeconomic sector despite pressures for liberalization, 
democracy, privatization and transparency. For example, throughout the early nineties, 
when development focused on market-led growth as the prevailing method to encourage 
growth and reduce poverty, the Egyptian government did not fundamentally reform or 
restructure its economy. Instead, the state promoted a “gradual” approach to any 
economic changes, which it continues today. Even at this gradual pace, structural 
adjustment, economic reform, and growth did little to promote stabilization, instead it 
socially and economically isolated a large part of the population. This indicates that the 
Egyptian government has its own agenda for development, which may be conducive 
neither to development of the marginalized and vulnerable nor the entire population as a 
whole.  
While the government of Egypt has taken steps to reduce poverty and increase 
social protection, these policies have been subject to extensive corruption and political 
negligence. Furthermore, Egypt generally follows a state led growth process with policies 
that, more often than not, serve the interest of the bureaucracy.  
 Therefore, the inability and ineffectiveness of the State to carry out effective 
social programs and policies can be attributed primarily to bureaucratic and political 
struggles inherent in the Egyptian policy making process. The economy plays a crucial 
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role in development, as it has historically been the means in which the government 
(beginning with Sadat) used to address poverty alleviation. Yet the government, through 
its socioeconomic polices, has not compensated the population by developing adequate 
infrastructure or developing the efficient capacity to facilitate further economic 
development in favor of the poor. Furthermore, the Egyptian economy is faced with other 
problems such as internal structural imbalances, unpredictability and reliance on 
international markets, and issues with foreign aid programs, all of which impact the 
ability of policy makers to sufficiently focus on targeting the poor and severely 
impoverished.200 In Egypt, political state interests compete for power between and within 
themselves, making an effective or cohesive state-led social strategy nearly impossible. 
Furthermore, there is hardly a consensus on what kind of social or economic path the 
country should pursue, whether socialist, capitalist, or Islamic. The “Government 
rationality is not in question; the type of rationality is. The government maintains policies 
more for political reasons than to reach economic-development goals. Maintaining 
stability and the status quo takes precedence over economic objectives”201 Therefore, in 
order to achieve any type of poverty reduction, the state must take a deliberate and active 
role in coordinating growth and poverty reduction. However, the power politics between 
bureaucracies, governmental ministries, the private sector, and other interests severely 
limit the ability of the state to understand and address poverty. The government has often 
been “accused of ignoring the needs of the poor and middle class by phasing out social 
programs and failing to address poverty and unemployment problems.”202 Furthermore, 
                                                
200  Sullivan, Denis. "The Political Economy of Reform In Egypt." International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 22.3 (1990): 318. 
201  Ibid., 317. 
202  El Din Gamal Essam. “No trickle down, no good.” Al Ahram Weekly. 16 Jan 2008. Issue 879. 
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the government is often charged with catering to the bureaucrats or business elite at the 
expense of the population.  
  In Egypt, policies are selected in order to maximize growth while poverty 
reduction is more of a secondary goal. Social safety nets, not growth, are the traditional 
method for combating poverty in Egypt. Thus, these complex factors impede the serious 
action taken to fix the economy. There has been no sound planning or policy reform, thus 
the poor and ultra poor in society are typically the ones who suffer most from these 
actions. This is further exacerbated by the lack of deliberation and cooperation, along 
with the absence of democratic decision-making and governance.  
The habit of leaving political and economic policies as marginal or as buttresses 
for the status quo has led to failure. Egypt under Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak did not 
adjust or change in a profound social or political way. The state has remained the 
dominant element in society, and as long as reforms are truly challenging to the existing 
social and political system, they are allowed to continue. However, this inaction is not 
sustainable and is clearly substantiated by the calls for change in society, economy, and 
polity on January 25th..  
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Chapter 4 
 
REFLECTIONS AND PERCEPTIONS IN EGYPTIAN SOCIETY 
  
 In order to gain a better understanding of the narrative of poverty in Egypt, I 
conducted a series of anonymous interviews with Egyptian citizens of various 
occupations. I asked questions and elicited comments concerning the social, economic, 
and political changes in Egypt. These interviews demonstrate one aspect of reality of the 
perceived social contract, the social and economic issues facing the country, and the role 
of the state.  They also shed light on many ideas presented in this thesis such as the role 
of the economy, government buracracy, state negligence, and social inequality. These 
interviews are also valuable in that they imply many of the opinions and attitudes of the 
‘average everyday Egyptian’ which is something this this thesis cannot do.  
 When asked about the challenges now facing Egypt, the responses were widely 
diverse, ranging from lack of religion to lack of political freedoms to overpopulation to 
traffic and to inequality. But almost all of the interviewees mentioned that they felt the 
pressure from increasing prices, especially during the last decade. This demonstrates that 
for many Egyptians income is the most commonly perceived indicator for poverty. Thus, 
in order to ‘fix’ poverty, the state should focus on income transfers. 
A kiosk manager from Sohag had moved to Cairo to work. He reports, “The 
prices have really increased. Today’s prices are expensive, but the economic situation has 
remained basically the same—not better or worse.”  
 A woman who owns a small framing business in Dokki explains that the biggest 
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challenge facing Egypt today is related to the population increases, both in the city and 
the country as a whole. “Overpopulation overflows into all aspects of life here, causes 
problems with the politics, economy, and life---all general areas.” “In the past, life was 
easier. People were able to breathe.”  While she has not seen any significant increase in 
business or profits, she does note that the population has felt the increase in prices for 
goods such as food, electricity, and other basic commodities. She acknowledges that 
rising prices and inflation are problems faced by all world economies and her friends in 
Saudi Arabia, Canada and the Emirates all complain about the same issues. The 
difference in Egypt, she argues, is that the problem is exacerbated by the fact that income 
and wages are not increasing to match rising prices. When asked about government social 
programs that are aimed at balancing the economic situation, she says, “There is a 
separation and the population doesn’t feel the effects of these programs. The government 
does these programs and people know about it—they read about it or see ministers on the 
TV—but they do not feel the effects or the responses of the government. But this is a 
thing happening all over the world. The economic problems are bigger than Egypt.” This 
comment helps illustrate the inaction and negligence of the state however, the woman 
makes a valid point in asserting that these are issues everywhere, and not unique to 
Egypt. But in Egypt specifically, she asserts that only the government employees, not the 
regular businessmen, feel any economic growth or progress in Egypt, that is those who 
actually initiate and have a vested interest in the current program feel the benefits. 
A man from Meniya who works at an ironing service on the street argues that 
wages have increased dramatically compared to the past. The problem is more related to 
globalization, capitalism, and greed. “Back in the old days, a taxi driver would take 15 
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L.E. home for a day’s work and be satisfied. Now he can make 50 L.E. and wants more.”  
His partner, another man from Aswan, responds that incomes are NOT increasing. 
The biggest socioeconomic problem in Egypt is that “there are 20 million people who 
live like kings in Cairo, Mohandiseen, Zamalek, Garden City, or Alexandria, for 
example, living at the top of life, while the other 50 million people of Egypt are eating 
each other.” He argues that it is an issue of humanity. “When something happens in a 
poor area, nothing happens. No police, no protection, no security. The poor, all over 
Egypt are not treated as humans.” “They don’t have the rights or means to get out of 
poverty and to exist, as humans“. As the man tells his story, his partner’s phone rings. 
“You see this? His brother is calling for help paying a dowry of 25,000 pounds. How is a 
man making 400 pounds a month supposed to make a family or a life?” When asked if 
poverty is tied to lack of income, he shakes his head. “It is a lack of humanity.” 
His friend hangs up the phone and immediately counters, “The government does 
not do projects for people, it does projects for itself.” “But the government should not be 
providing food and shelter for everyone. Or else I wouldn’t want to work.” One cannot 
not rely on the government. He states, “Why should we?” His friend argues, “When you 
get a degree, the government should give you a job.” Both of these men reflect a large 
and real discrepancy in the perception of poverty and the role of the state. They are both 
adult males from Upper Egypt with similar socioeconomic backgrounds. One may reflect 
upon his circumstances, as one living in poverty while the other may not. Yet which one 
is poor? Also, one feels like the government does nothing for it’s people and should 
continue to do so. The other disagrees. So where does the social policy maker fit? Does 
he listen to the first man or the second? 
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Yet in terms of education, both men specify that the circumstances have gotten 
worse over the past two decades. The man from Menia declares, “Show me anyone with 
a diploma from a government public school and you will see they cannot even read or 
write.” In terms of other public services, they both prefer private sector enterprises or 
charitable organizations because the quality of government services is bad. The services 
exist, the men acknowledge, but even those who cannot afford healthcare will not go to 
public government run facilities, instead they pay for private ones despite their low 
incomes.  
The man from Menia continues, “If everyone went out and worked hard, made 
their own money and struggled, then the country would be a better place. Everyone wants 
everything for free, even if they don’t need it.” If the government did more, people would 
only want more. “No-one is ever satisfied, not with Nasser, not with Sadat, and not with 
Mubarak.” It seems that this man, one who by some standards would be considered poor, 
seems to have a realist view on the social and political patterns of the state. He notes the 
inaction of the government and acknowledges that things are unlikely to change. 
However he does not look to the state for change, but the issue is within the population. 
Yet his opinion seems to differ from the hundreds of sociologists, economists, and 
political scientists who have written countless reports, assessments, and 
recommendations for the Egyptian State to reform its policies. 
These two men have lived in Cairo for the past 17 years, work at the same 
business, and struggle with many of the same issues.  But their opinions reflect some 
discrepancies on the social and economic challenges facing Egypt. Both did agree, “The 
job situation has remained the same as it had in the past. Who has been on “top” stays on 
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top, the bottom stay on bottom,” in their experience. When asked about this lack of 
progress or change in Egypt, in terms of his own circumstances, the man from Menia 
shakes his head. “As long as I struggle and work hard, I am satisfied. The economy goes 
up or down, it doesn’t really affect us at all.”  
The man from Aswan reports that poverty in Upper Egypt hasn’t gotten any better 
or worse over the last couple decades. The other man argues that poverty is decreasing. 
Regarding his village in Menia, “in the old days, our houses were made poorly with 
crumbly red brick, now our houses are made from solid concrete with running water and 
electricity.” There has been some progress, albeit limited. 
A man who sells fruit on a cart from a street corner has been working there for the 
past 45 years. He says the biggest problem he faces in terms of socio-economic 
circumstances is the price hikes. Over the past several decades, “the man who was always 
rich stays rich, the guy who was poor is always poor.” The fruit man has no fixed salary, 
but works day to day. “The government has programs for us, such as insurance and social 
services. But at the end of the day, if the poorest man in Egypt spends 800 pounds a 
month and the government only provides 200 pounds, how is he supposed to live, to get 
by, to get out of poverty?” He says the government should do more, even though he 
concedes that the government is trying to help the people at the very bottom. For the fruit 
seller, “it's an issue of money” that would fix many problems in Egypt. 
A teacher at a language school in Nasr City declares, “The problems are 
increasing prices. The unemployment is rising especially over the last 20 years.” “The 
government says they are trying, but the effects are slow and do not reach the 
population.” “There is poverty, and it is big, whether it is growing or decreasing I do not 
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know. But there have been increases in the quality of services and he gave as an example 
the new metro line. 
Another man from Menifeya who does freelance tutoring, says that the socio-
economic issues facing Cairo are many. “In terms of politics, in the past, the Egyptian 
government and its ministries had better leadership.” He also mentions that the value of 
the pound is not worth what it used to be in the past, adding to many economic hardships 
of the population. In terms of poverty, “we don’t just hear about it, we live it. The 
government doesn’t feel the people’s circumstances. The government services and social 
programs, these are not helping the situation, simply pressure relief. If you give people a 
little bread, they don’t riot. But the quality and accessibility is bad.” When asked about 
increasing prices, he argues, “Price rises hurt the poor the most. Not just the government, 
but the private sector, hospital administrations, all these things have management 
problems and they only seek profit, not equality for the general people.” 
A young man who works as an errand runner for a small business notes that there 
is not a consistent process of addressing the social and economic problems in Egypt. He 
says that everyone hears about different reforms and programs targeting social problems 
in the country. But, “Poverty is a very big problem, especially in Egypt. There are 
necessary things and luxuries. In Egypt, things such as food, housing and transportation, 
these are some necessary things and many people don’t have these things in Egypt.”  
A religious teacher from Shubra argues that the economic crisis, specifically the 
food crisis and the global economy, are the biggest problems. He has lived in Cairo for 
over 60 years. “In the past, goods were presented at subsidized prices and people could 
afford them. Now they are sold at high above market prices and the people’s incomes do 
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not match.” He goes further saying, “The World Bank is the major problem sources of 
issues new in developing countries. They increase the burdens of poor countries rather 
than alleviate them.” 
“The increase in population was never the problem. The problem is bureaucracy 
management.” While he admits that poverty has decreased but it is not a recognizable 
decrease, not enough to really feel a change in the country. “Poverty is not simply the 
lack of money. Being impoverished is not living in a healthy environment.” He also 
agrees with other interviewees that even though government services are available, 
people will go to private or charity services despite their poverty. The “quality of 
government services is awful.” The problem, he continues, doesn’t come from the 
government, but from all management in Egypt. There is some support, but they don’t 
use resources wisely. Most services and social programs are just talk. “They are not real 
programs. They aren’t executed, just developed to get support from the people.” When 
asked if he believes that people do, in fact, support and believe that the government, 
society, and economy are progressing, he shakes his head. “Not one person who has lived 
here long. It’s just a cycle with no results.” 
It is not to be assumed that these interviews provide an accurate or infallible 
glimpse in to Cairo’s urban life. The survey was narrow, the sample was not completely 
random, and a trained sociologist did not conduct the interviews. While these 
methodological fallacies are acknowledged, this survey did provided a more qualitative 
understanding of my research as well as shed light on some of the paradoxes in Egyptian 
society.  
Something that was interesting to note was the idea of the Egyptian economy. 
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Many of my interviewee’s noted that they did not feel any changes (besides price 
increases) in terms of the economy. For them, it seemed to be some intangible entity that 
does not truly or directly affect their lives. The irony in this is that changing and 
reforming the economy has been (and to some extent, still is) something many believe as 
a panacea to fix many of the fundamental social problems in Egypt. Furthermore, many 
of the subjects brought up ideas that I reflect upon in this thesis. For example, the idea of 
the government as a pressure relief, the commitment of the state to the status quo, and the 
idea that nothing fundamental would change in Egyptian society or polity. These are all 
ideas that my subject’s implied they felt and experienced in every day life. Many of their 
sentiments echo the idea that there has been no sound planning or policy reform, thus the 
poor in society are typically the ones who suffer most from these actions. 
These interviews demonstrate a very real disconnect between the government and 
people. When asked about the development of different reforms undertaken to stabilize 
and promote social reform throughout the country, one man waves his hand. “These are 
just numbers produced to give hope. The businessman and the minister are the only ones 
who feel growth.” This demonstrates that there is not only an issue of inequality in terms 
of socio-economic situation, but substantiates the evidence that state social initiatives are 
not felt by the population.  The status quo has been perceived as a constant. 
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Conclusion 
 
The recent revolution on January 25, 2011 reminds both Egyptian citizens and the 
international community the importance of issues such as state responsibility, social 
equity, welfare, and poverty. Understanding and effectively targeting poverty is a 
complicated social, economic, and political process within Egypt. The commitments and 
obligations of the government towards the poor evolve through a ‘transitioning’ 
framework of social contract.  
Regarding the issue of poverty, this thesis concludes that understanding who the 
poor are and what defines their level of deprivation is critical in the state’s responsibility 
to its citizens. Modern interpretations of poverty have expanded past fixed principles of 
welfare and have expanded into a more comprehensive understanding of this 
multidimensional process. This is essential to understand how the poor are identified, the 
dynamics of poverty, and the structure of welfare and social protection policies. Poverty, 
and all of the variables of this process, is a tremendous challenge in Egypt. The state has 
historically addressed this issue within the broader context of societal welfare; that is, it 
has not always specifically targeted the marginalized and vulnerable groups.  
Nasser sought to achieve public acceptance through Arab socialism, a social 
contract between the government and people. Public polices such as universal education, 
healthcare, subsidies, and agrarian reform were given in exchange for state domination. 
However, these policies required massive social spending, and were unsustainable in the 
long term. Sadat continued the consolidation of power and government autonomy, yet 
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sought to open the market, promote capitalist reforms, and focus on the private sector and 
foreign investment to generate revenue rapidly while still attempting to continue to 
provide some welfare benefits. The oil boom and interregional migration helped the 
Egyptian economy in terms of revenue, remittances, and employment. However, under 
Sadat, the Egyptian state became heavily dependent on rents, allowing the government a 
certain degree of domestic autonomy due to its monopoly on resources, revenue, and 
economic power. This too, was unsustainable. Sadat faced population problems, rising 
inequality and unemployment, and a decline in overall welfare. Mubarak continued the 
liberalization and privatization polices of Sadat in order to achieve economic 
development. This growth would promote higher living standards, reverse increases in 
unemployment, reduce poverty, and most importantly, integrate Egypt into the world 
economy. To counter the negative social outputs of economic reform, the government 
attempted to respond to social needs through institutions such as the Social Fund for 
Development and various social protection programs.  
It was not until much later that Mubarak actively sought to address the social, 
political, and economic needs of the poor. Improvements in social development 
indicators from Sadat and Mubarak demonstrate a shift in the government’s attitudes, 
objectives, and commitments to society. Poverty reduction was no longer merely a matter 
of social policies that benefit the broader population (Nasser) or a factor of economic 
growth (Sadat and early Mubarak) but as a multidimensional process that addresses the 
complexities of deprivation. However, within all three governments there was little 
political freedom as a part of social or economic discourse, the state remained 
autonomous. 
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Mubarak’s extension of free market capitalist polices and his attempt to embrace 
welfare reform presents an uncomfortable paradigm in which the state’s responsibility to 
its citizens is supposedly changing. Initiative rarely goes beyond dialogue; the state relies 
on decisions not made. The Egyptian state has tried to transition from a rentier economy 
to a welfare state without upsetting the status quo of the ruling bureaucracy and state 
agents. Meanwhile it has also tried to become a more welfare-oriented regime, attempting 
to cater to a population without really progressing. Effective and comprehensive policies 
cannot target the needs of society as long as the government remains committed to the 
status quo. 
Egypt under Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak did not truly adjust or change in a 
profound political way. The state has remained the dominant element in society, and as 
long as reforms are truly challenging to the existing social and political system, they are 
allowed to continue. However this is not sustainable, clearly substantiated by the calls for 
change in society, economy, and polity on January 25th..  
“The welfare state implies a social contract with the citizenry. It has now been 
one of the chief organizing principles of the lives of several generations and, hence, it 
represents a deeply institutionalized contract. Indeed, herein lies an obstacle to possibly 
any reform. As so much attitude research has shown, the welfare status quo remains very 
popular.”203 
The purpose of this thesis is not to recommend for Egypt to turn further to pro-
capitalist reforms or embrace a welfare state, but to look at the historical polices 
underneath these umbrellas and understand how the state has not fit into either socio-
economic model. The state does not fit into any applicable model. It does not deviate 
                                                
203  Esping-Andersen, Why We Need a New Welfare State, 7. 
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from a state led agenda while being subject to arbitrary, autonomous whims of an 
ineffective and indecisive government. So in asking, what commitments or obligations 
does the government have towards the poor in society? The answer lies in a paradox. The 
Egyptian state has tried to transition from a rentier economy to a welfare state without 
upsetting the status quo of the ruling bureaucracy and state agents. Meanwhile it has also 
tried to become a more welfare-oriented regime, attempting to cater to a population 
without really progressing. This has led to a stalemate in social policy. Effective and 
comprehensive policies cannot target the needs of the poor as long as the government 
remains committed to the status quo. 
This relationship between state and society has evolved, but not in a fundamental 
or truly progressive way. Social progress has been made; however, the inefficiency of the 
state has promoted the status quo. Egypt has not integrated into the global economy, and 
it also is not truly undertaking a transition to a welfare state to encompass a new social 
contract. 
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APPENDIX A: 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY FOR INTERVIEWS 
 
In my survey, I asked 6-7 general questions as to get a full, unreserved opinion of 
the subject on the topic of social change, the role of the government, and poverty and 
welfare in Cairo. I did not tape any interviews, however I recorded notes. The 
participants were all over 18, most are between the ages of 45-60.  
I wanted to conduct this survey to get a more qualitative understanding of what is 
happening to a general group of members of society—to put a "face" on my research. 
Thus, a few personal experiences of some citizens are relevant in order to compare what I 
have written and researched about, with their own personal opinions and experiences.  
The questions were broad in order to give the interviewee freedom to talk about 
issues he believes to be the most relevant, rather than my own opinion. Thus, when I 
asked about social change, I did not infer or reference any particular idea to the subject, 
but allowed the interviewee to interpret and define the question in his or her own way. 
My intention was not to lead the subjects into answering a specific way, for example 
poverty or social deterioration is certainty not assumed to be the biggest problem of any 
of the subjects. Question 3 is intended to determine what issue the subject found most 
important at the time. Is their socioeconomic situation the most urgent problem? Is it 
even a problem? Some of the interviews were not directly applicable to my work, 
however I continued the interviews anyway. For many interviews, the subject did not 
answer the question with a simple yes or no, but elaborated on their own personal 
experiences and narratives. This was very enlightening and I included many of their 
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stories in my thesis. 
My survey does not operate under the assumption that all people in Egypt are 
suffering from social or poverty related problems. Similarly, attitudes towards the 
Government’s social programs are also hotly contested and I did not assume that the 
subject shares my personal interpretation from my research. 
 
Survey Questions 
1. What is your name? 
2. How long have you lived in Cairo? 
3. What is the biggest challenge you think is facing Egypt? 
4. Have you experienced any changes in your own personal social or political 
situation during the past twenty years? If so, what type of changes? 
5. What do you think the government is doing? 
6. Are there social programs that you have access to? In terms of education or 
health? 
7. Do you think that the Government’s social safety net programs are reaching 
you? (Such as the food subsidy system, cash transfers, microloans, etc.?) 
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